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INTRODUCTION 
In the coming year, the political leadership in Iraq will need to 
make a final determination as to whether they are going to structure 
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the state of Iraq as a federal state with ethnically heterogeneous  
provinces, a loose federal state with ethnically defined provinces or 
regions, or whether they are going to divide the state into three new 
states based on ethno-sectarian lines. 
A number of prominent American law makers and foreign policy 
shapers have strongly advocated for the soft, and sometimes hard, 
partition of Iraq—either through the creation of a loose federal  
structure based on ethno-sectarian lines, or through its outright  
partition.1 These commentators have prophesized that the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq “may soon be all we have left.”2
In fact, the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq is fraught with  
logistical infeasibilities and dangers that threaten to compound the 
issues facing the people of Iraq instead of solving them. The  
political solution rests not on a return to failed approaches of division 
and entrenched conflict, but rather on the construction of a viable 
modern federal state that promotes unity, political compromise, and 
consensus building. 
To address the question of whether the future of Iraq rests with 
ethno-sectarian division or with multi-ethnic federalism, this Article 
first addresses the ideas behind ethno-sectarian division and  
describes the most prominent plans for the division of Iraq along 
ethno-sectarian lines. This Article then critiques such a division of 
Iraq by: (1) identifying the overwhelming lack of popular support for 
such a division; (2) exposing the practical and political difficulties of 
dividing a state as diverse and heterogeneous as Iraq; (3) discussing 
the likelihood that ethno-sectarian division will increase violent  
conflict; (4) highlighting the lessons of prior ethno-sectarian  
divisionist attempts; (5) noting insurmountable constitutional  
hurdles; and (6) setting out the significant signs of recent progress 
and cooperation in the Iraqi political framework. 
 
 1. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Op-Ed., A Plan to Hold Iraq Together, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 24, 2006, at A21. 
 2. EDWARD P. JOSEPH & MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, BROOKINGS INST., 
ANALYSIS PAPER NO. 12: THE CASE FOR SOFT PARTITION IN IRAQ, 31 (2007), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06iraq_ 
joseph/06iraq_joseph.pdf (underlining the problems associated with a soft partition 
before admitting the options in Iraq are narrowing). 
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Next, this Article sets forth a plan for an enhanced federal  
structure based on the existing Iraq Constitution and recent Iraqi 
laws. The proposal begins with the fundamental position that Iraq  
requires a federalist structure based upon an eighteen governorate 
model as set forth in the Constitution. With the sub-federal  
boundaries already drawn, Iraqis are in a position to devolve  
appropriate power to these entities in an asymmetric and gradual 
manner. With this power devolution, Iraq would benefit from the 
development of resource and revenue distribution systems to  
promote fair and equitable economic growth across the federation. 
Coordination mechanisms, such as framework legislation and dispute 
resolution committees, could be established to ensure that the 
transition to viable federalism occurs with minimal encumbrance. To  
respect the complex and diverse identities of Iraqis, the government 
must erect safeguards to protect the rights of sub-federal entities and 
Iraq’s many minorities. 
I. ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION 
Ethno-sectarian division involves the partition or decentralization 
of a state along ethnic and/or sectarian lines.3 At the core of ethno-
sectarian division argument is the so-called security dilemma.4  
According to Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University, the  
security dilemma exists when one community faces a distrustful 
“other” while at the same time its own defensive actions are viewed 
as antagonistic to the security of that other.5 Thus, when war begins, 
 3. Great debate exists surrounding the definition and use of the terms 
“ethnicity” or “ethnic” and “sectarian.” Some prefer the former, while others prefer 
the latter. From our vantage point, both appear to have valid arguments. To avoid 
this fray, we have intentionally chosen the term ethno-sectarian. Our intent is to 
use this term as broadly and inclusively as possible and to leave the nuances to 
those more versed in the subject. Therefore, for the purposes of this Article, the use 
of the term ethno-sectarian division refers to division of Iraq along primarily 
Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish lines. 
 4. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 (explaining that the  
security dilemma is “[d]rawn from the realist school of international relations, . . . 
[and] that in a state of anarchy, one state’s defensive action makes everyone less 
secure.”). 
 5. See Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD 
POLITICS 167, 169-70 (1978) (contemplating the difficulty in increasing personal, 
community, or national security without appearing threatening to other groups); 
see also Barry Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, SURVIVAL, 
SIMPSON-WILLIAMS_TO PRINT.DOC 12/4/2008  12:03:18 PM 
2008] RETHINKING THE POLITICAL FUTURE 195 
 
mobilization of all members of one group is necessary, as other 
groups are likely to recognize those members as enemies.6 Once war 
mobilizes ethnic groups, “the war cannot end until the populations 
are separated into defensible, mostly homogenous regions.”7 Those 
advocating for ethno-sectarian division believe that the restoration of 
civil politics cannot occur unless the groups are separated into  
defensible, ethnically-determined enclaves. They argue that that  
solution designed to avoid population transfers, such as power-
sharing or state re-building, are insufficient in and of themselves to 
resolve the security dilemma.8
Chaim Kaufmann, a staunch proponent of ethno-sectarian  
partition, defines partition as a separation “jointly decided upon by 
the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not 
under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed 
on both sides by a stronger third party.”9 Ethno-sectarian division 
may be accomplished either by partitioning a state into smaller ethnic 
based states, or through the creation of a loose federal or confederal 
structure based upon ethnically defined provinces.10 The general idea 
behind ethno-sectarian partition is that if ethno-sectarian groups 
 
 
Spring 1993, at 27, 29 (suggesting that the security dilemma is intensified when 
the opponents belong to different ethnic groups). 
 6. Nicholas Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical 
Critique of the Theoretical Literature, in LIVING TOGETHER AFTER ETHNIC 
KILLING: EXPLORING THE CHAIM KAUFMANN ARGUMENT 41, 42 (Roy Licklider & 
Mia Bloom eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic 
War] (citing Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil 
Wars, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1996, at 136, 150 [hereinafter Kaufmann, Possible 
and Impossible Solutions]) (summarizing and analyzing Chaim Kaufmann’s  
hypotheses about ethnic interaction during war times and the security dilemma). 
 7. Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions, supra note 6, at 150. 
 8. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 42. 
 9. Chaim D. Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers 
and Partitions in the Twentieth Century, INT’L SECURITY, Fall 1998, at 120, 125 
n.12. 
 10. Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Comment, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent  
“Recourse to Rebellion?” A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi  
Constitutional Structures, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 321, 330 (2007) (proposing 
that ethno-sectarian divisions as the basis for political units stems from the desire 
to group already cohesive community units together to increase the chances of  
creating a functioning governmental unit). 
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cannot live together in a heterogeneous state, then it is better to form 
multiple homogeneous states or provinces.11
II. CALLS FOR THE ETHNO-SECTARIAN  
DIVISION OF IRAQ 
Those calling for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq are the  
dominant voice in the current discourse surrounding the political  
future of Iraq.12 Their argument begins with the belief that “Iraq is 
deeply divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.”13 For them, Iraq has 
three separate and distinct ethno-sectarian communities, namely 
Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd.14 In analyzing this position, Toby Dodge, a 
Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, describes their rationale as follows: 
[t]hese communities, it is claimed, are largely geographically  
homogenous and mutually hostile. They have been locked in 
an artificial, Sunni-dominated state for eighty-five years. This 
analysis leads its promoters to view the post-Saddam civil 
war as tragic but largely unavoidable. This approach asserts 
that Iraqi politics has always been and will continue to be 
animated by deeply held communal antipathies; the civil war 
is simply an outcome of this. From this perspective, there can 
only be one policy option: the situation will be stabilized by 
dividing the country into three smaller, ethnically purer and 
more manageable units.15
 11. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 588 (2d ed., 2000); 
see also AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 44-47 (1977). 
 12. See, e.g., JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2; Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed.,  
Divide Iraq into Three States, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 26, 2003, at 8; Peter W. 
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 13, 2004, at 42  
[hereinafter Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq]. 
 13. DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
FIASCO 237 (Westview Press 2005). 
 14. See id.; Gelb, supra note 12, at 8 (implying that the fact that the three  
ethnic groups do not already exist as one country is a matter of historical accident); 
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, supra note 12, at 45 (describing the varying  
desires of the three predominant ethnic groups). 
 15. Toby Dodge, State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics, in IRAQ:  
PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 23, 25 (Markus E. Bouillon, David 
M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) [hereinafter Dodge, State Collapse]. 
SIMPSON-WILLIAMS_TO PRINT.DOC 12/4/2008  12:03:18 PM 
2008] RETHINKING THE POLITICAL FUTURE 197 
 
It is only upon the nature of the smaller, ethnically purer and more 
manageable units that those arguing for ethno-sectarian division  
differ. Generally speaking, ethno-partitionists call for the creation of 
highly autonomous or independent units, which exercise the powers 
of self-government,16 while ethno-federalists advocate for a federal 
structure built upon ethnically based regions with an overlay of a 
central government with limited power and authority.17
A number of prominent commentators have called for the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq,18 and at least two detailed, published plans 
for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq have been put forward. 
Common to both these plans is an explicit deviation from the present 
political structure as set forth in the Iraqi Constitution. 
At the forefront of the debate is the Biden-Gelb Plan. In the spring 
of 2006, U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. and President Emeritus of 
the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie H. Gelb co-authored a plan 
aimed at resolving the increasing violence and hardening political 
stalemate in Iraq by shaping an Iraqi federal structure along ethno-
sectarian lines.19
 16. See, e.g., Gelb, supra note 12, at 8 (“The only viable strategy, then, may be 
to . . . move in stages toward a three-state solution: Kurds in the north, Sunnis in 
the center and Shiites in the south.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Unity Through 
Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A19 (advocating the division of 
Iraq into three autonomous regions with responsibility for domestic law,  
administration, and security while the central government retains control over  
defense of its borders, foreign affairs, and revenue from oil). 
 18. See, e.g., Alexander B. Downes, More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as 
a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, 27 SAIS REV. 49, 58-59 (2006) (characterizing a 
partitioning of Iraq into three regions as inevitable); Peter W. Galbraith, Op-Ed., 
Our Corner of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A19 [hereinafter Galbraith, Our 
Corner] (advocating the creation of Sunni and Shi’a regions in Iraq and the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops except a small force that could be left behind in 
Kurdistan to prevent al-Qaeda’s surge in power in Iraq); Simon Jenkins, Op-Ed., 
The Fantasy is Over, We Must Partition Iraq and Get Out Now, SUNDAY TIMES 
(LONDON), May 21, 2006, at 16 (advocating the governorates’ unification into 
Sunni and Shi’a regions under Chapter 5 of the Iraq Constitution); Catherine 
Larkin, Talabani Supports Proposal to Divide Iraq into Three Regions, 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 7, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=aYraIgKc_A50 (noting that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani 
supported Biden’s plan for federalism in Iraq). 
 19. See JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., IRAQ: A WAY FORWARD (2006), available at 
http://americancentristparty.net/PDF/planforiraq.pdf (summarizing the Biden-Gelb 
plan). 
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The core of the Biden-Gelb plan is to replace the current  
governorate system with three distinct ethno-sectarian regions—one 
Sunni, one Shi’a and one Kurdish20—and create a mechanism to 
share Iraqi oil proceeds among the three regions.21 The plan further 
calls for the United States, in conjunction with the United Nations, to 
convene an international conference to engage Iraq’s neighbors22 and 
for a framework for reducing U.S. forces in the region.23 Lastly, the 
plan envisions the allocation of additional funds to assist in 
reconstruction and to establish a jobs program to offer Iraqi youth an 
alternative to the militias that remain prevalent in Iraq.24
In June 2007, using the Biden-Gelb plan as his template, Senator 
Biden, in conjunction with Senators Brownback, Boxer, Smith, 
Nelson, and Hutchison, sponsored a bi-partisan resolution supporting 
a political settlement among Iraq’s “major factions.”25 The resolution 
passed the Senate on September 26, 2007 with seventy-five votes in 
support.26 Representative Gallegly sponsored an identical resolution 
in the House of Representatives.27 Biden’s colleague and co-sponsor 
of the Senate bill, Senator Sam Brownback, clarified that the “major 
factions” referenced in the bill were the three “main ethno-sectarian 
groups” of Iraq: the Shi’a, the Kurds, and the Sunnis.28 According to 
 
 20. Id. at 2 (stating that the plan seeks to “[p]ut the central government in 
charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign policy, oil production 
and revenues [and] [f]orm regional governments . . . responsible for administering 
their own regions”). 
 21. See id. (recommending that U.S. policymakers push to for an “agreement 
for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing them 20 percent of 
all present and future oil revenues - an amount roughly proportional to their size - 
which would make their region economically viable”). 
 22. See id. (suggesting that the U.S. should work to have Iraq’s neighbors 
“pledge to support Iraq’s power sharing agreement and respect Iraq’s borders”). 
 23. See id. (positing the need for only a residual force of as few as 20,000 in a 
very short time-frame). 
 24. See id. 
 25. S. Con. Res. 37, 110th Cong. (2007) (advocating for a federal structure to 
implement a political settlement). Representative Gallegly sponsored an identical 
resolution in the House of Representatives. H.R. Res. 688, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 26. See 153 CONG. REC. S12093, 12095 (2007) (roll call vote no. 348). 
 27. H.R. Res. 688, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 28. Reidar Visser, The U.S. Senate Votes to Partition Iraq, Softly, HIST. POL. 
IMAGINING, Sept. 27, 2007, http://historiae.org/biden.asp [hereinafter Visser, The 
U.S. Senate Votes]. 
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Biden and Gelb, such a division, “may be the only way to prevent a 
violent partition . . . and preserve a unified Iraq.”29
Brookings Institute scholars Edward Joseph and Michael 
O’Hanlon developed a second prominent ethno-sectarian divisionist 
plan for Iraq (the “Brookings Plan”). The Brookings Plan, authored 
in the summer of 2007, sets out the means for implementing a so-
called soft ethno-sectarian-based partition.30 The Brookings Plan 
argues that soft ethno-sectarian partition is the lesser of a number of 
possible evils,31 and points to increased ethno-sectarian killings, 
political choices, and population movements into homogenous 
communities as an indication that Iraqis are leaning more towards 
separation than ever before.32 Even though most Iraqis today still do 
not favor soft partition,33 the Brookings Plan argues, indicators of 
Shi’a support for soft partition, along with the on-going sectarian 
civil war, mean that ethno-sectarian partition may soon become “the 
best option available for Iraq.”34
A central element of the Brookings Plan is facilitating the 
voluntary relocation of populations.35 The plan proposes dividing the 
country into Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish regions, none of which would 
be ethnically pure, but would be defined by natural geographic 
boundaries as much as possible.36 The plan advocates dividing major 
cities like Baghdad and Mosul along natural boundaries, but with the 
goal of minimizing population transfers.37 Under the Brookings Plan, 
the ethno-sectarian division could provide equal distribution of 
 29. BIDEN, supra note 19, at 3. 
 30. See generally JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2 (differentiating between 
soft partition of the type proposed in the Biden-Gelb plan and hard partition, 
involving outright division of Iraq). 
 31. See id. at 1 (admitting that while partition might not be ideal, the truths 
observed on the ground begin to make partition look like a plausible alternative). 
 32. See id. at 1-3 (describing instances of Iraqis disapproving of rational 
alternatives to partition, thus creating the inference that Iraq’s citizens are 
accepting the idea of separation). 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. at 13. 
 35. See id. at 15 (implying that numerous people feel unsafe but may need help 
to move). 
 36. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that the number of inter-sectarian marriages 
alone precludes any possibility of ethnically homogenous regions). 
 37. See id. at 16 (asserting that the Tigris River embodies a useful demarcation 
of different ethnic zones). 
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country’s oil wealth, compensation and assistance to all persons 
chosing to relocate and protection for minorities in the new regions.38
In addition to the two plans above, several organizations have 
advocated for the ethno-sectarian based “hard partition” of Iraq into 
three independent states. In 2006, a number of prominent 
commentators predicted that such partition was likely inevitable.39 
Highlighting the Kurdish threat to secede,40 they claimed the de facto 
partition that allegedly already existed provided an irreversible 
inertia towards hard partition along ethno-sectarian lines.41 In the 
summer of 2007, the Washington D.C. based think tank Fund for 
Peace issued a report considering the merits of a hard partition of 
Iraq.42 The report called for the creation of three independent 
political states based on ethno-sectarian lines along with the creation 
of a new political order modeled loosely after the European Union.43
 38. Id. at 17. 
 39. See Patrick Cockburn, Sectarian Break-Up of Iraq is Now Inevitable, Admit 
Officials, THE INDEPENDENT, July 24, 2006, at 18 (reporting that members of 
Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish parties were examining the possibility of dividing Iraq 
along ethnic lines); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Burdensome Weight of Unity Could 
Force Iraq Break-Up, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,214820,00.html (relating that Abdel Aziz Hakim, a prominent Shiite 
politician, called for the formation of a Shiite region in southern Iraq similar to 
Kurdistan in northern Iraq). 
 40. See, e.g., Yahya Barsanji, Kurdish Leader Threatens Iraq Secession, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2006, available at www.institutkurde.org/en/info/ 
1157362753.html (reporting that the “leader of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq 
threatened secession Sunday as a dispute over flying the Iraqi flag intensified”); 
Steve Negus, Iraq’s Kurds Threaten Secession Over Oil Rights, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2006, at 7 (noting that the Kurdish Prime Minister asserted that “[i]f Baghdad 
ministers refuse to abide by that constitution, the people of Kurdistan reserve the 
right to reconsider our choice” to participate in Iraq’s voluntary union). 
 41. See, e.g., Vlahos, supra note 39 (noting that Tony Sullivan, director of Near 
East Support Services, a defense consulting firm, asserted that “[t]he partitioning is 
already in progress in Iraq . . . . What is happening in Iraq, I think, is a movement 
into . . . civil war or partitioning”). 
 42. See generally PAULINE H. BAKER, THE FUND FOR PEACE, A WAY OUT: THE 
UNION OF IRAQI STATES (2007), http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/images/pdf/ 
Iraq-report07full.pdf (attempting to provide systematic analysis of the progress or 
lack of progress by using various metrics to measure progress). 
 43. See id. at 6 (discussing the possibility of a relationship among three 
independent Iraqi states with economic, but not political ties). 
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III. THE CASE AGAINST THE ETHNO-SECTARIAN 
DIVISION OF IRAQ 
The common theme among the above cited proposals is the 
division of Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines. Ultimately, regardless of 
the mechanism or method by which it is achieved, the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq is not the best way forward for Iraqis or the 
international community. 
In the following analysis, this Article sets out a series of critiques 
of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq. First, and perhaps foremost, 
Iraqis oppose the ethno-sectarian division of their country. Next, any 
attempt to divide the diverse and heterogeneous modern day Iraq will 
result in a cartographic conundrum, as neat ethno-sectarian lines are 
nearly impossible to draw. Further, the ethno-sectarian division of 
Iraq will not end the violence. The prevalence of inter-sectarian and 
non-sectarian based violence, the disintegration of the Iraqi central 
government, the alienation and isolation of Iraqi minorities, and the 
likelihood of opportunistic or defensive neighbors all suggest the 
violence in Iraq will continue. Iraq’s diversity would also necessitate 
the forced relocation of thousands of Iraqis that will only compound 
the on-going displacement. Historically, the ethno-sectarian division 
of states has been a failure. In light of the diversity of the proposed 
regions, a constitutionally valid formation of three ethno-sectarian 
regions is highly unlikely. Finally, given the successful efforts of the 
Iraqi parliament to adopt key pieces of legislation in February 
2008,44 the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would fail to capitalize 
on the emerging political cooperation. 
A. IRAQIS OPPOSE ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION 
As violence raged in the summer of 2006, seventy-eight percent of 
Iraqis opposed the division of Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines.45 
 44. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs 
Measurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A1 (noting that Iraqi politicians passed 
“three far reaching measures . . . .”). 
 45. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 8 n.34 (noting that an International 
Republican Institute poll conducted in July 2006 “reported [seventy-eight] percent 
of respondents disagreeing with the suggestion that Iraqis should be segregated 
according to religion or sect”). 
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More recent polling shows that one in six Iraqis believe forcible 
separation of people along ethno-sectarian lines had occurred in their 
area,46 and ninety-eight percent of Iraqis polled saw this division as 
“a bad thing for Iraq.”47
Following the passage of Biden’s resolution in the U.S. Senate, 
Iraqis voiced near-unanimous opposition. Iraq’s parliamentary 
political blocs issued a joint statement criticizing the ethno-sectarian 
division as “a threat to Iraq sovereignty and unity . . . based on an 
incorrect reading and unrealistic estimations of the history, present 
and future of Iraq.”48 Individual Iraqi leaders also condemned the 
resolution, including Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who 
stressed that, “the Iraqi people, government, constitutional 
institutions, and civil society organizations” had rejected the ethno-
sectarian division plan.49 Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki also 
reportedly called the Biden-Gelb plan a “catastrophe.”50 Further, 
Sharwan al-Wa’ili, Iraqi Minister of State for National Security,
 46. ABC NEWS/BBC/NHK POLL, SECURITY GAINS REVERSE IRAQ’S SPIRAL 
THOUGH SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN 40 (2008), http://abcnews.go.com/images/ 
PollingUnit/1060a1IRaqWhereThingsStand.pdf [hereinafter 2008 POLL]. 
 47. ABC NEWS/BBC/NHK POLL, IRAQIS’ OWN SURGE ASSESSMENT: FEW SEE 
SECURITY GAINS (2007), http://www.abcnews.go.com/images/US/1043a1Iraq 
WhereThingsStand.pdf [hereinafter 2007 POLL] (reporting that “separation is 
enormously unpopular: ninety-eight percent [of Iraqis], with agreement across 
ethnic and sectarian lines, oppose it.”). 
 48. Stephen Zunes, Support for Iraq Partition: Cynical and Dangerous, 
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4639; see 
also Ned Parker & Raheem Salman, A Divided Iraq Unites Against Partition Plan, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A4 (describing the Iraqi politicians reaction to the 
Senate resolution as a “rare show of unity,” but one in which they uniformly 
“skewered” the proposition); Iraqi TV Channels Carry Reactions to US Senate 
Resolution, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 10, 2007 (stressing 
the possibility of a law to ban all possibility of a split of Iraq into multiple entities). 
 49. Iraqi TV Channels Carry Reactions to US Senate Resolutions, supra  
note 48. 
 50. See, e.g., Mohamed Khodr, Iraq, Iraq, Partitioning Iraq for a Nomination, 
MEDIA MONITORS NETWORK, Oct. 15, 2007, http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/ 
view/full/46672 (asserting that partition “of Iraq is opposed by Iraq’s Prime 
Minister Nuri Al Maliki, a Shiite, who called the plan a ‘catastrophe.’ the Iraqi 
Parliament, the O.I.C, representing all [fifty-seven] Muslim nations (Organization 
of Islamic Conferences), the Arab League, [and] the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(includes Saudi Arabia)”). 
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called on Iraq and the world to “denounce it as a disastrous 
resolution.”51
The Arab media also condemned the proposal for the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq.52 Rejection of Biden’s resolution “filled 
editorial pages across the Arab world, and has widely been 
interpreted as an imperialistic attempt to decide both Iraq’s and the 
region’s fate.”53 Iraqi and other Arab editorials voiced strong support 
for federalism, but opposed strongly the idea of ethno-sectarian 
division.54
Even supporters of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq recognize 
that it is not a viable plan without the support of Iraq’s Sunni Arab 
population. According to the authors of the Brookings Plan, “Iraq’s 
Sunni Arabs bitterly and categorically reject” their version of ethno-
sectarian division, adding that it is hard to find “any initial support” 
among Sunnis, and ultimately concluding that “winning Sunni Arab 
acquiescence for such a plan—without which it could not be safely 
implemented—will be difficult.”55
B. A CARTOGRAPHIC CONUNDRUM 
The perception of an already divided Iraq of three ethnic 
communities motivates many of those who argue for a formal ethno-
sectarian division.56 To describe Iraq as divided into three easily 
 51. Iraq Minister in al-Hayah Rejects US Senate Resolution, BBC 
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 3, 2007. 
 52. See Trudy Rubin, Why a Plan for Iraq’s Soft Partition Would Backfire, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2007, at A15 (relating a conversation the author had with 
the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the general uproar over the resolution). 
 53. Kathleen Ridolfo, Criticism of U.S. Senate’s Partition Resolution Echoes 
Across Arab World, RADIO FREE EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 4, 2007, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/770D037B-73B3-45F2-91BB-2456A7 
AE8318.html. 
 54. See, e.g., BBC Monitoring Weekly Roundup of Iraqi Press 26 Sep to 02 
Oct. 07, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 2, 2007; see also 
Iraq’s Al-Bayyinah Editorial Censures US Senate’s Partition Resolution, BBC 
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 4, 2007; Kuwaiti Emir Warns 
Against Iraq Partition, US-Iranian Friction, BBC MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – 
POLITICAL, Oct. 3, 2007; Saudi Editorial Warns Against Partitioning Iraq, BBC 
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST – POLITICAL, Oct. 20, 2006. 
 55. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 10. 
 56. See BIDEN, supra note 19, at 2 (calling for the division of Iraq into three 
regions: Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd). 
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demarcated, mutually hostile communities, however, is a “static 
caricature that does great damage to a complex, historically 
grounded, reality.”57 The intensity of ethno-sectarian tension that 
exists in Iraq today is a recent development, feeding largely on the 
security void left by the dismantlement of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
and the initial inability to create an effective central government.58 
Further, the prevalence of diverse and multi-ethnic cities makes 
dividing those cities along ethno-sectarian lines unfeasible.59 Finally, 
massive relocations of Iraqis, when combined with a census over ten 
years old, makes determining exactly where individuals live for 
purposes of dividing the state impossible.60
1. Complex Identities 
The reality of Iraqi identity is rooted in a complex history, and not 
simply upon ethno-sectarian characteristics.61 Historically, Iraq’s 
 57. Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 25; see also Reidar Visser, 
Centralism and Unitary State Logic in Iraq from Midhat Pasha to Jawad al-
Maliki: A Continuous Trend?, HIST. POL. IMAGINING, Apr. 22, 2006, 
http://www.historiae.org/Maliki.asp [hereinafter Visser, Centralism and Unitary 
State Logic] (explaining that while the “unitary state model” was created 
artificially by the British, nevertheless it was a philosophy and organization that 
quickly found wide-spread support within the population, with the exception of the 
Kurds); Gary Bass, Breaking up (a Country) is Hard to Do, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 
2006, at B3 (relating that many respected experts are very skeptical of the idea that 
a partition would create homogenous and stable regions); Aaron S. Klieman, The 
Resolution of Conflicts Through Territorial Partition: The Palestine Experience, 
22 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y HIST. 281, 291 (1980) (postulating whether partition results 
in short-term security but necessarily leads to long-term fighting and strife); Thom 
Shanker, Divided they Stand, but on Graves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at WK1 
(revealing the probable necessity of a large peace-keeping presence for years to 
come to maintain any proposed partition). 
 58. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Buried Bomb Kills 5 G.I.’s in Baghdad 
Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A3 (describing the Iraqi government 
as “disastrously ineffective”). 
 59. See GARETH STANSFIELD, IRAQ: PEOPLE, HISTORY, POLITICS 57 (2007) 
(discussing the deep-rooted divide between Sunni and Shi’a). 
 60. See SAMEER N. YACOUB, Iraq Plans to Conduct General Census Next Year, 
Associated Press, June 10, 2008, available at http://wiredispatch.com/news/ 
?id=205701 (noting that Iraq’s last census, conducted in 1997, did not include 
several northern Kurdish provinces). 
 61. See generally WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ (2005) (tracing the 
history of Iraq from ancient times through modern occupations to demonstrate the 
difficulties that the United States may face by ignoring Iraq’s complex history); 
CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (2000) (developing the modern political 
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social classes were complex and differentiable along lines of 
property ownership, income, and political influence in addition to 
ethnicity, religion, and sectarianism.62 According to Reidar Visser, a 
research fellow at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 
“[t]o many Iraqis, the ethno-religious community is but one of 
several possible foci of identity . . . . Instead, villages, towns and 
regions have shaped identities.”63 Similarly, Laith Kubba, former 
spokesman for the Iraqi Prime Minister, has highlighted the historical 
lack of inter-communal tension among Iraqis,64 and even some 
ethno-partitionists acknowledge the recency of the sectarian divide.65 
One prominent historian of modern Iraq has also suggested that the 
sectarian violence and population displacement “is taking place for 
the first time in Iraq’s modern history.”66
history of Iraq and discussing the evolution of relations among Iraqi ethnic 
groups); TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION-BUILDING AND 
A HISTORY DENIED (2005) (outlining the development of Iraqi government from 
the British occupation to the U.S. invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein and 
suggesting that Iraq’s occupiers have often ignored Iraq’s history). 
 62. See generally HANNA BATATU, THE OLD SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE 
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS OF IRAQ 6-7 (2004) (discussing the varying 
categories that make up the definition of “class” in the context of Iraq). 
 63. AN IRAQ OF ITS REGIONS 2 (Visser & Stansfield eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
Visser & Stansfield]; see also Public International Law & Policy Group & The 
Century Foundation, Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in 
Iraq: Some Basic Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 69 (2003) [hereinafter 
Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure] (indicating that Iraqi 
Shi’a more often identify with their Arab culture rather than their Shi’a sectarian 
group, as evidenced by their fighting alongside their fellow Sunni Arabs in the 
Iran/Iraq war and against the Persian Shi’a of Iran). 
 64. Laith Kubba, Senior Dir. for the Middle East and North Africa, Nat’l 
Endowment for Democracy, Remarks at the American University International 
Law Review and Public International Law and Policy Group Symposium, 
Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq (Feb. 11, 2008) (transcript on 
file with the American University International Law Review). 
 65. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Road to Partition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2007, at A27 (describing the sectarian divide through the eyes of an Iraqi 
politician: “there is a wall in her mind separating Sunnis from Shi’a, a wall that 
was erected during Saddam’s persecution and that has been fortified by the 
violence since.”). 
 66. Phebe Marr, Iraq’s Identity Crisis, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW 
GENERATION OF CONFLICT 45 (Markus E. Boullion, David M. Malone & Ben 
Roswell eds., 2007) (blaming the overlap of a variety of fears, including loss of 
jobs and violence, for the sectarian divide). 
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Much of this recent rise in ethno-sectarian tension is attributable to 
the security vacuum that followed the collapse of the Saddam 
Hussein regime.67 When central state authority crumbles, individuals 
are freed from institutional restraints and lose the protection 
normally supplied by public offices.68 Thus, in response, they often 
seek safety, profit, or both.69 Once the state’s capacity is removed, its 
ability to influence is reduced greatly, and ultimately “[p]eople will 
look to whatever grouping, militia, or identity offers them the best 
chance of survival in times of profound uncertainty.”70 Often offering 
hope are “ethnic entrepreneurs” who mobilize significant portions of 
the population on the basis of communalistic identity: “[p]reviously 
‘fuzzy’ or secondary identity traits become politicized and 
‘enumerated.’ The struggle to survive, to gain a degree of 
predictability for yourself and your family, then becomes obtainable 
primarily through the increasingly militant deployment of ethnic or 
sectarian identity.”71 Thus, the lack of institutional and coercive 
national government authority is a significant cause of the recent rise 
of ethno-sectarian tension in Iraq as Iraqis starving for protection 
turn to the only organizations that appear to offer it: groups 
organized along ethno-sectarian lines. 
 67. See Ayad Rahim, Attitudes to the West, Arabs, and Fellow Iraqis, in IRAQ 
SINCE THE GULF WAR: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 189-91 (Fran Hazelton ed., 
1994) (citing a “ rising resentment and growing rift between Sunni Arabs and the 
rest of the population” fostered by the Hussein regime, Rahim states that Iraqis 
began retreating into particular clans or sects because they feared they could trust 
no one but close family members). 
 68. See Nelson Kasfir, Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent 
Predation: Causes of Failure, in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 54-55 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2004). 
 69. Id. at 55. 
 70. See Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 26; see also Daniel N. Posner, 
Civil Society and the Reconstruction of Failed States, in WHEN STATES FAIL: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 237, 240-41 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2004) (observing 
that when the public order is in disarray, people’s concern turns toward survival); 
Andrea Kathryn Talentino, The Two Faces of Nation Building: Developing 
Function and Identity, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 557, 569 (2004) 
(examining experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, and concluding that when a state 
begins to disintegrate, the organizations at the local level are reinforced and 
creating a culture in which exclusion is favored). 
 71. Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 27. 
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2. Urban Areas 
Even if ethnic identities were paramount, the diversity of the 
heavily populated major urban areas will ultimately result in sixty-
seven percent of the Iraqi population falling outside of any 
conceivable ethno-sectarian divisionist plan.72 With nearly forty 
percent of Iraqis living in the multiethnic cities of Baghdad and 
Mosul alone, dividing these cities, as well as Iraq’s other major 
urban centers, may well be impossible.73 The division of major urban 
centers has historically been difficult,74 and there is no reason to 
expect that a contemporary division would be any less so. Given the 
challenge inherent in dividing Iraq’s major cities along ethnic lines, 
most calling for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq have proposed 
exceptions to their plans ranging from administering Baghdad as an 
international city,75 to allowing it to form its own region76 (despite 
the Constitution’s prohibiting Baghdad from joining any region).77 
Regardless, any ethno-sectarian divisionist plan would require 
exception of some sort for major urban areas. With such exceptions 
swallowing the rule, it is reasonable to challenge the rule. 
3. Who Lives Where? 
Finally, the last official Iraqi census was more than ten years 
ago.78 Coupled with the thousands of undocumented Iraqi casualties 
since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime,79 the two million or so 
 72. See UNICEF, IRAQ: STATISTICS, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ 
iraq_statistics.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (stating that sixty-seven percent of 
the population lives in urban areas). 
 73. Anthony Cordesman, Op-Ed., Three Iraqs Would be One Big Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at A27. 
 74. See id. (“We have seen in Northern Ireland and the Balkans how difficult it 
is to split cities . . . .”). 
 75. See BIDEN, supra note 19. 
 76. JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 16. 
 77. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 120. 
 78. See Press Briefing, United Nations Statistics Division, Press Briefing on 
Iraq Demographics (Aug. 8, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/ 
docs/2003/iraqdemobrf.doc.htm (explaining that the 1997 Iraqi census data is 
inaccurate because it excluded the three Kurdish governorates); see also 
Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (“There has never been a meaningful census of 
Iraq showing exactly how its Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’a, Kurds and other factions 
are divided or where they live.”). 
 79. Compare IRAQ BODY COUNT HOME PAGE, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ 
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displaced Iraqis,80 the impossibility of determining where Iraqis live 
for purposes of drawing ethno-sectarian lines becomes apparent. 
Without knowing where Iraqis live, no one can precisely determine 
which ethno-sectarian groups dominate which areas, thus making 
implementation of a plan to divide Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines 
essentially impossible. 
C. ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION  
WILL NOT END THE VIOLENCE 
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq will not end the violence.81 
Those advocating for ethno-sectarian division fail to account for the 
extensive non-ethno-sectarian motivated violence.82 The isolation of 
minorities following an ethno-sectarian division will present 
increased danger for residual minorities. Neighboring states and 
interested parties may either be threatened by the consolidation of 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2008) (estimating that up to 90,000 documented civilians 
have died in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion began in 2003), with Gilbert Burnham 
et al., Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample 
Survey, 368 THE LANCET 1421 (2006) (estimating that approximately 655,000 
more Iraqi civilians have died than would otherwise have died if the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq had not occurred). 
 80. See UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY [UNHCR], IRAQ SITUATION 
RESPONSE: UPDATE ON REVISED ACTIVITIES UNDER THE JANUARY 2007 
SUPPLEMENTARY APPEAL 1 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/partner/ 
PARTNERS/469632e32.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, IRAQ SITUATION RESPONSE] 
(noting that of the two million internally displaced Iraqis, many were displaced 
under Saddam Hussein’s regime). 
 81. See Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 84-85 
(concluding that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem of violent 
ethnic antagonism). In fact, Sambanis puts forth a rival hypothesis: “if borders can 
be credibly and securely redrawn, then combining several large ethnic groups in a 
larger, multi-ethnic state may reduce the probability of new wars.” Id. at 84; see 
also JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 31 (2006),  
available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_ 
study_group_report.pdf (postulating that not only will the ethnic-division of Iraq 
not end the violence, it is only likely to make the situation worse); Rend Al-Rahim, 
Op-Ed., Partition is Not the Solution . . ., WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2006, at B7 
(analogizing a potential partition of Iraq with the problems facing India and 
Pakistan over the Kashmir region and concluding that the ethno-sectarian division 
of Iraq will not end ethnic violence but will likely lead to further conflict over 
greater power and control of resources and regions along the partition lines). 
 82. BAKER, supra note 81, at 10-11 (describing the multiple groups responsible 
for violence in Iraq, including jihadist groups and organized crime). 
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ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq, or may try to exploit it to their 
advantage. 
1. Non-Ethno-Sectarian Motivated Violence 
The radical decentralization of power along ethno-sectarian lines 
presents the distinct danger of instigating a violent struggle for 
supremacy among already warring intra-sectarian factions.83 Further, 
much of the violence occurring in Iraq today stems from profiteers 
masquerading as sectarian fighters, and the ethno-sectarian division 
of Iraq will do nothing to quash their activities.84
The predominant Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups are far from 
homogeneous or monolithic. Illustrations of intra-sectarian discord 
are readily available, as “intense political rivalries that include armed 
conflict, historical variables, and cultural and economic differences” 
make the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq a considerable challenge.85 
In February 2008, in the Sunni dominated al-Anbar province, Sunni 
tribal blocs forming the al-Anbar Salvation Council demanded that 
the Islamic Party (also Sunni) close its headquarters, “threatening ‘to 
declare war’ and to use force against the party if the party does not 
meet these demands within one month.”86 In the predominantly Shi’a 
part of Southern Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) 
and Sadr movements are locked in a bloody power struggle, with 
Diwaniya, Basra, Nasriya, Samawa and many other cities witnessing 
“armed conflict, assassinations, and bombings attributable to the 
rivalry between the two factions.”87 Demonstrating Sadrists accused 
rival Shi’a, which control Iraqi security forces, of engineering raids 
and detentions by U.S. and Iraqi forces to prevent them from 
mounting an effective campaign against their rival Shi’a parties for 
 83. See Dodge, State Collapse, supra note 15, at 33 (wondering if many 
reverse cause with effect, associating the increased violence with ethno-sectarian 
differences, rather than the increased instability and violence resulting in more 
ethno-sectarian distrust). 
 84. Id. 
 85. REND AL-RAHIM FRANCKE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 
POLITICAL PROGRESS IN IRAQ DURING THE SURGE 16 (2007), available at 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr196.pdf. 
 86. Muhammad Yousef, Sunni Internal Conflicts in al-Anbar, NIQASH, Feb. 24, 
2008, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=266&id=2161 (last  
visited Sept. 5, 2008). 
 87. FRANCKE, supra note 85, at 15. 
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the upcoming provincial elections.88 Some fear that the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq would lead to a fierce battle for control 
between the Badr Brigade and Muqtada al-Sadr for the Shi’a region 
in the south.89
The Kurds have also experienced internal fighting, both within 
Iraq and among Kurdish populations in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.90 In 
Iraq, rival Kurdish factions often have conflicted or cooperated based 
on their political objectives.91 In 1975, the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) split, and Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK).92 During the Hussein Regime’s Anfal campaign 
against the Kurds in the late 1980s, the two parties cooperated to 
resist the Iraqi government.93 When Hussein’s control of the region 
weakened and the Kurdistan Regional Government formed, the 
parties again began fighting, often violently, to assert their presence 
in the region.94 To be fair, however, the Kurds in Iraq have taken 
 88. See, e.g., Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Sadrists Fight On in Basra, 
Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=icr&s=f&o=343673&apc_state=henpicr 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2008). 
 89. See, e.g., Interview by Foreign Policy with Dr. Toby Dodge, Reader in 
International Politics, Queen Mary University of London (Sept. 7, 2007), available 
at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3982&page=1 [hereinafter 
Seven Questions] (purporting that there “is a low-level civil war between the two 
main Shi’a parties led by members of the Badr Brigade and al-Sadr” and partition 
would greatly inflame these tensions). 
 90. See Martin van Bruinessen, The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq, MIDDLE E. 
REP., July-Aug. 1986, at 14 (listing many of the conflicting Kurdish groups both 
within and outside Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, which 
clashed with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and which helped the Iranian 
government drive Iranian Kurds out of areas near the Turkish border). 
 91. See generally id. (discussing internal conflict as a hindrance to the Iraqi 
Kurdish nationalist movement). 
 92. See Theodore McLauclin, Self-Interest and the National Idea in Iraqi 
Kurdish Politics, 1978-2003, 13 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the American University International Law Review) (citing GARETH 
STANSFIELD, IRAQI KURDISTAN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENT 
DEMOCRACY 83-85 (RoutledgeCurzon 2003)) (explaining that the KDP consisted 
mostly of tribal leaders, while the PUK comprised “urban socialists”). 
 93. See DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 368-83 (3d 
ed. 2004) (discussing the cooperation of Barzani, of the KDP, and Talabani, of the 
PUK, under the Kurdistan Front to oppose the Iraqi Government’s oppression of 
the Kurds and to negotiate the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government). 
 94. See INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 171-74 (2d ed. 
2002) (suggesting that Kurdish infighting has led to the displacement of Kurds)); 
see also McLauchlin, supra note 92, at 14-27 (discussing all of the periods of 
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greater strides than any of the other groups toward intra-sectarian 
cooperation. Despite their often violent history, in January of 2006 
the two main Kurdish parties reached a power sharing agreement that 
fostered greater unity in the Kurdish region.95
Additionally, profiteers disguised as ethno-sectarian fighters are 
responsible for far more of the violence in Iraq than most Westerners 
appreciate. According to Rend Al-Rahim, Senior Fellow at the 
United States Institute of Peace: 
[v]iolence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas 
avenging former murders and assassinations or revenge 
killing of former Baathists accused of criminality under the 
previous regime. The skein of violence is further tangled by 
the proliferation of gangs that are mini-mafias masquerading 
as sectarian or political militias. These groups are only 
interested in profit, and they engage in the lucrative trade of 
killing or evicting residents, looting their homes, and renting 
the houses to new residents.96
For instance, Sadr’s Mahdi Army continues to exploit their fellow 
Shi’a in Sadr-dominated territory, gaining control of real-estate and 
businesses to turn a profit.97 Other rogue militias, claiming to be 
affiliated with Sadr, carry out exploitation and “thuggery” for 
personal gain.98 The lack of effective governing and security 
structures in Iraq is resulting in Iraq’s “‘breaking down’—not into 
cohesive territorial units based on ethnic and sectarian identities—
conflict and cooperation among the KDP and the PUK from 1975 to 2003 and 
noting that by 1996, the tensions between the KDP and PUK had escalated to open 
war, with each party using force, sometimes in the form of tanks, to seize the other 
party’s stronghold positions. 
 95. Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Kurds Agree to Unify Administrations, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/ 
2006/01/9d8fcdd7-2da3-4035-b63c-7676f7819b24.html. 
 96. FRANCKE, supra note 85, at 3-4. 
 97. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IRAQ’S CIVIL WAR, THE SADRISTS AND THE 
SURGE, i (2008), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm? 
lng=en&id=48011 (underscoring the increasing ruthlessness of the Sadrists as they 
continued to increase their wealth). 
 98. See id.; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 
(UNHCR), COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION: IRAQ 14 (2005), available at 
http:www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/435637914.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION] (indicating that kidnapping and hostage taking 
is prevalent, and that the kidnappers often ask for money). 
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but into fiefdoms controlled by militias, political parties, and 
shadowy local figures.”99 Thus one reason for the apparent 
prominence of ethno-sectarian identity is profit. Iraqi’s are saying, 
“‘I’m not joining for ideological reasons, but I cannot feed my family 
any other way, and here people are offering money and cash.’”100
None of this is to say that ethno-sectarian motivated fighting does 
not exist in Iraq, for it surely does. But rather, in addition to the 
sectarian fighting, extensive fighting within and regardless of ethno-
sectarian groups exists, and as a result, the ethno-sectarian division 
of Iraq is not sufficiently tailored to the source of violence. Though 
significant numbers of Iraqis report being forcefully displaced,101 the 
vast majority of people in all but a few ethnic groups felt that they 
were targeted for reasons other than their ethnicity.102
2. The Not-So-Minor Affect on Minorities 
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may condemn residual 
minorities to discrimination and second-class citizenship and 
possibly instigate violent instability.103 One empirical work studied 
the relationship between ethnicity and political violence and 
concluded that the highest propensity for ethnic violence exists at 
extreme polarization; i.e. the highest risk zone for violent conflict 
exists “when an ethnic bloc may be sufficient in size to permanently 
exclude others from the exercises of power.”104 Robert Jervis has 
 99. Marr, supra note 66, at 53. 
 100. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION, IRAQ’S 
DISPLACEMENT CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/pdf/iraq_refugees.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
 101. 2007 POLL, supra note 47, at 30. 
 102. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION IN IRAQ, IOM 
EMERGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENTS: POST FEBRUARY 2006 DISPLACEMENT IN IRAQ 
3 (2008), available at http:// http://www.iom-iraq.net/library.html#iomIraq (follow 
hyperlink for 15 March 2008 report). 
 103. Andreas Wimmer, Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq, 
SURVIVAL, Winter 2003-04, at 111, 125 (hypothesizing that “ethnic cleansings and 
forced resettlements will continue” and that the less well established sects, such as 
Christians and Turkmen, will experience discrimination perpetrated by local 
government). 
 104. ROBERT H. BATES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, ETHNICITY, CAPITAL FORMATION, AND CONFLICT 28 (1999), 
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/027.pdf. 
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also noted that in most modern civil conflicts both security and 
predatory motives exist.105 The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq may 
thus exacerbate the predatory motives of majority populations 
against residual minorities.106 If areas were formed around Shi’a, 
Sunni, and Kurdish populations, the minority populations located 
within those newly formed areas may have to conform to the ethnic 
and cultural persuasions of the area. The ethno-sectarian division of 
Iraq would prove even more problematic for nomadic minority 
groups or those dispersed across multiple areas.107
3. The Spillover Effect 
The Iraq Study Group suggested the ethno-sectarian division of 
Iraq may encourage ethnic fighting elsewhere in the Middle East.108 
Indeed, Arab states have already denounced plans for ethno-sectarian 
division as proffering an unacceptable threat to both Iraq and the 
region.109 Rend Francke voiced a similar concern in her public 
commentary, arguing that neighboring states with an interest at stake 
may intervene directly or increase their support to Iraqi factions.110 
At the very least, increased discord among Iraq’s neighbors will do 
little to alleviate the existing tension. 
For instance, Turkey and Iran have significant Kurdish regions, 
and increased Kurdish autonomy may create greater tension with 
their own Kurdish populations.111 According to Donald Horowitz, 
 105. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 45. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., Wimmer, supra note 103, at 125 (underscoring the plight of the 
“smaller, dispersed minorities” unless strong federal power implements minority 
rights which are in turn upheld by a reliable judiciary). 
 108. BAKER, supra note 81, at 31. 
 109. See Saudi Editorial Warns Against Partitioning Iraq, supra note 54 
(declaring the “illusions of partition . . . [as] an escape from national responsibility 
and a retreat to delusions”); see also Kuwaiti Emir Warns Against Iraq Partition, 
supra note 54 (reporting the warnings of Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad Al 
Sabah, that partitioning Iraq could endanger both Kuwait and the rest of the Middle 
East). 
 110. Al-Rahim, supra note 81 (predicting that Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia would all intervene if partition occurred). 
 111. See Gretel Kovach, War Pushes Turk-Kurd Tension to Breaking Point, 
PAC. NEWS SERV., Mar. 20, 2003, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_ 
article.html?article_id=e0b81f415ecf72e790c34f36d9a4829a (adding that “Turkey 
has said it will invade if Iraqi Kurds attempt to form their own state); see also 
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“Turkey resents support by Iraqi Kurds for the Kurdish rebellion in 
southeastern Turkey. The Turks could not, under any conditions, 
tolerate an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, which would be a beacon for 
its own Kurds.”112 The Iraq-Turkey border has already witnessed a 
significant build up of Turkish troops, and Turkey has promised to 
retaliate against any showing of independence by Turkish Kurds.113 
Further, Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian concerns intensified after 
significant recent events affecting the greater Kurdish community, 
including extensive rioting by Iranian Kurds following the enactment 
of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (“TAL”),114 the end of 
PKK’s cease-fire,115 disturbances in Kurdish-populated areas of 
Syria,116 and the increase in violence in southeastern Turkey.117
A look at the Sunni dominated areas suggests that ethno-sectarian 
division would only increase the dominance of Sunni Islamist 
extremist groups over the Sunni insurgents and average Iraqis.118 If 
average Iraqi Sunnis are left without oil money (a foreseeable 
consequence of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq), Arab Sunni 
Michael Knights, The Three-Way Game: Iran, Iraq, and the United States, WASH. 
INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y, June 21, 2005, http://www.washingtoninstitute 
.org/templateC05.php?CID=2345 (noting that the tension would expand to the 
relationship between Baghdad and Tehran). 
 112. Donald Horowitz, Unifying Iraq: Partition is the Path to More War—
Multiple Wars, in Fact, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007, at A16 [hereinafter Horowitz, 
Unifying Iraq]. 
 113. Id. (adding that Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds currently experience flourishing 
commercial relations which would be undone in a flash and would likely lead to a 
“war between two allies.”); Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (stating that 
“Turkey, Iran and Syria would seek to destabilize the north and exploit the 
divisions between the two main Kurdish political unions.”). 
 114. Gary Thomas, Protests Erupt in Kurdish Areas of Iran, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/ 
2005/iran-050805-25bd3f42.htm (explaining that Iranian Kurds were upset that 
Iraqi Kurds were getting rights that they desired). 
 115. Jonny Dymond, Kurds Move to End Turkish Truce, BBC NEWS, May 29, 
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3760285.stm. 
 116. Bill Park, Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy, 
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2004, at 19, 22 (2004) (furthering that Ankara’s long held 
fear is that Kurdish resistance could create an independent Kurdish state which 
would destabilize the region as a whole). 
 117. Yigal Schleifer, How Will Turkey Respond to Growing Rebel Violence, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, at 7, Sept. 22, 2004 (revealing the growing conflicts 
between extremist Kurds and the Turkish people). 
 118. See Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27 (asserting that this would hinder the 
war on terrorists). 
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states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would likely feel the need to lend 
support, to help prevent Islamist extremists from taking over the 
Sunni area of Iraq.119
Turning to the south, the creation of a nine-province Shi’a region 
would expose it to significant Iranian influence.120 Although some 
Shi’a leaders may be receptive to Iranian influence, many other Shi’a 
are hostile to Iran as they view themselves as Arabs, not Persians, 
and maintain the allegiances that led them to fight with the regime of 
Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.121 In addition to the 
increased role Saudi Arabia may play in a Sunni region, the Saudis 
object strongly to the idea of a Shi’a region in the south.122 Saudi 
Arabia’s adherence to the “ultra-strict” Wahhabi Sunni school of 
Islam has led to strained relations with Shiite Iran and even its own 
Shi’a population.123 Saudi Arabia thus has serious reservations about 
another Shi’a dominated region next door.124
In the end, the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq could permeate 
throughout the Middle East and the Arab world, “creating a risk of 
local conflicts and the kind of religious tension that feeds Islamist 
extremism.”125 In the words of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, 
“Iraq’s disintegration will be a bomb that will blow up the Middle 
East.”126
 119. Id. 
 120. See Horowitz, Unifying Iraq, supra note 112 (noting that the nine-province 
region has been pushed for by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim’s party). 
 121. Id. (asserting that a combined southern region would be a setback for both 
the Shi’a that view themselves as Arabs and for American interests). 
 122. See Juan Cole, Partitioning Iraq, SALON.COM, Oct. 30, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/10/30/iraq_partition/ (last visited Sept. 
6, 2008) (elaborating that U.S. President Bush and Vice President Cheney are 
particularly attentive to Saudi concerns and would therefore also view an 
autonomous Shi’a region as undesirable). 
 123. See id. (estimating that Shi’a form about ten percent of the Saudi 
population). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27. 
 126. See Iraq Partition will Blow Mideast Up, PRESS TV, Oct. 19, 2007, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=27747&sectionid=351020201 (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2008) (elaborating that safeguards of Iraq’s territorial integrity are needed 
to avoid bloodshed in the Middle East). 
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D. MASS RELOCATION OF PERSONS 
The ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would inevitably cause the 
mass displacement of persons. The Brookings Plan projects 
approximately two to five million Iraqis might move as a result of 
ethnic-sectarian partition.127 While some plans side-step the issue, 
none deny it, and many even call for transferring groups to 
appropriate sides of the line so that they are “demographically 
separated into defensible enclaves.”128 Such displacement, however, 
is unadvisable, because the widespread relocations would likely be 
“violent and impoverish those forced to move, leave a legacy of fear 
and hatred, and further delay Iraq’s political and economic 
recovery.”129 Further, this relocation will only compound the on-
going displacement of Iraqis, and would be inconsistent with Iraqi 
and U.S. obligations under international humanitarian law. Such 
mass displacement would also necessitate increased coalition support 
and resources. 
1. Displacing the Displaced 
The relocation necessary to accomplish the ethno-sectarian 
division of Iraq would only compound the on-going displacement. 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 127. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 19-20 (allowing that the 
numbers are huge but the lowest is comparable to what has already happened in 
Iraq since 2003). 
 128. Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions, supra note 6; see also Gary 
Bass, Breaking up (a Country) is Hard to Do, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2006, at B3 
(adding that Kaufmann proposes interning civilians on the wrong side of the line to 
be used in a population exchange). 
 129. Cordesman, supra note 73, at A27; see also BAKER, supra note 81, at 31. 
[D]evolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central 
control [Federalism] … could result in mass population movements, collapse 
of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, 
destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to 
dominate Iraqi regions. [Further], Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that 
such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the 
United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. Id. 
But see, JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 11 (“insisting that people remain in 
danger to prop up an illusion of political co-existence presents an even larger 
moral problem. If offered reasonable alternatives and secure passage, there are 
indications that many Iraqis, currently living in fear as vulnerable minorities, 
would willingly leave their homes.”). 
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(“UNHCR”), there are 3.7 million displaced Iraqis.130 The UNHCR 
anticipated an increase of one million displaced persons in Iraq in 
2007.131 Many of the displaced have resettled in urban areas, such as 
Baghdad and Basra,132 in addition to Kurdish regions where they 
experience relatively more security and increased job prospects.133 
Any attempt to divide those cities or the Kurdish region may 
therefore require the displacement of the already displaced. 
Further, internally displaced Iraqis from the majority of areas 
overwhelmingly report their intention to return to their place of 
origin. The desire to return home weakens the argument that the 
current pattern of relocation to more ethnically homogenous areas is 
a permanent indicator of the voluntary fragmentation of Iraqi society 
along ethnic lines. In the Baghdad area where approximately sixty-
five percent of all displaced Iraqis originate,134 over seventy-two 
percent indicated their desire to return to their place of origin.135
 130. See Sudarsan Raghavan, War in Iraq Propelling a Massive Migration, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2007, at A1 (continuing that about 2 million of the displaced 
Iraqis have left Iraq to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). 
 131. KRISTÈLE YOUNÈS, THE WORLD’S FASTEST GROWING DISPLACEMENT 
CRISIS: DISPLACED PEOPLE INSIDE IRAQ RECEIVING INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE 10 
(2007), available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/issue/detail/9915 
(asserting that given the Iraqi government’s reticence in addressing this growing 
problem, the international community has a responsibility to respond to the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq). 
 132. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION, supra 
note 100, at 18 (continuing that less than one to two percent of displaced Iraqis are 
in camps). 
 133. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Many IDPs Seek Refuge in 
Kurdish Regions which are More Stable (2007), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/82EA9EA6AF6142
BFC12572AD0028DCFA?OpenDocument#24.3.1 (adding that the region’s local 
economy has benefited from the migration of skilled professionals with disposable 
incomes). 
 134. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT: 
2007 YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://www.iom-iraq.net/Library.html 
(follow hyperlink for Iraq Displacement 2007 Year in Review, English) 
[hereinafter IOM, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007]; see also Elizabeth Ferris, Co-
Director, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement (Dec. 7, 2007) The 
Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2007/1206_iraq_ferris.aspx?emc=lm&m=211
677&l=22&v=33934 (placing the number of IDPs originating in Baghdad at 
approximately eighty percent of all IDPs). 
 135. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT: 
2006 YEAR IN REVIEW (2007), at 9, available at http://www.iom-
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2. A Violation of International Humanitarian Law 
The mass movement of up to five million people necessary to 
accomplish the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would contravene 
international humanitarian law. Under the Guiding Principles of 
Internal Displacement, which the participants at the United Nations 
World Summit recognized unanimously in September of 2005 “as an 
important international framework for the protection of internally 
displaced persons,”136 all states have an obligation “to prevent and 
avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.”137 The 
Guiding Principles provide that “[e]very human being shall have the 
right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or 
her home or place of habitual residence.”138 This prohibition includes 
displacement “based on policies of apartheid, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or 
similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious 
or racial composition of the affected population.”139 The ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq clearly involves altering the ethnic 
composition of various areas within Iraq. Moving Shi’a, Sunni, and 
Kurdish Iraqis from their homes across the state into regions of 
ethnic homogeneity would thus be a displacement that is inconsistent 
with the Guiding Principles. 
iraq.net/library/2006%20Iraq%20Displacement%20Review.pdf [hereinafter IOM, 
IRAQ DISPLACEMENT: 2006] (elaborating that many of these people are waiting for 
security to improve). 
 136. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 137. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report 
of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted 
pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, Annex, Section II, Principle 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement]; see also Ferris, supra note 134 (suggesting that the Guiding 
Principles serve as an international standard to guide governments as well as 
international humanitarian and development agencies in providing assistance and 
protection to IDPs and that they obligate the Iraqi national government to protect 
and assist IDPs within its jurisdiction); Walter Kalin, A Tragedy of Increasing 
Proportions: Internal Displacement in Iraq, FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW, June 
2007, at 14, 15 (suggesting that the Guiding Principles obligate the Iraqi 
government to ensure that those who were not able to escape forced displacement 
and remain in Iraq are protected and assisted). 
 138. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 137, at Annex, 
Section II, Principle 6.1. 
 139. Id. at Annex, Section II, Principle 6.2(a). 
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3. Unrealistic Troop Requirements for Coalition Forces 
The mass movement of people necessary to accomplish the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq will also require a great deal of U.S. 
support and involvement.140 In fact, the Brookings Plan devotes 
several pages to a detailed proscription for the U.S. led relocation of 
persons,141 conceding that U.S. led Coalition forces and Iraqi security 
units should plan for population movements that are fraught with 
danger.142 Indeed, the Brookings Plan acknowledges that “at a 
minimum” international troop levels would need to be of such a size 
that they “did not scale back deployments in some places while 
helping to protect relocating populations elsewhere.”143 Further, they 
acknowledge that “it might actually take somewhat more troops to 
implement the soft partition plan than are in Iraq at present.”144 With 
coalition budgets and troop levels stretched to their limits, the ethno-
sectarian division of Iraq would unquestionably require more 
coalition support. 
E. THE HISTORICAL FAILURE OF  
ETHNO-SECTARIAN DIVISION 
History demonstrates that ethno-sectarian divisions often fail to 
lessen the violence.145 Many instances of violent conflict follow 
 140. See JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 17 (“any person who felt the 
need to relocate would have to be compensated fairly and assisted in finding a new 
life elsewhere.”). 
 141. Id. at 17-20. 
 142. See id. at 17 (adding that “[t]hose relocating might be targeted by hateful 
neighbors seeking a final chance to settle scores and to ensure that those departing 
never return. The displaced individuals themselves might be tempted to take 
revenge on their oppressors, with parting shots and burning of the homes of their 
enemies. Furthermore, as some members of a local minority relocate, those 
minority members remaining behind might feel particularly vulnerable and might 
be targeted for expulsion by thugs from the local majority. Finally, even after 
moving out of their neighborhoods, convoys of relocating individuals might be 
attacked along their departure route. Nothing about the relocation process would 
necessarily be easy.”). 
 143. Id. at 25. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, FOREIGN 
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 22. (arguing against a partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
given the occurrences of violence associated with several historical examples of 
partition). But see JOSEPH & O’HANLON, supra note 2, at 11. 
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ethno-sectarian division, as the forced transfer of populations 
instigates violent conflict,146 and often requires a sustained military 
and fiscal commitment by both the parties involved and the 
international community. 
War in Cyprus followed its division between 1963 and 1967, and 
Turkish intervention in 1974.147 During this time, 7,500 people were 
killed and over 200,000 Turkish and Greek Cypriots displaced.148 A 
United Nations force remains in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots 
The population movement and expulsions created conditions for the final 
recognition of Croatia’s borders, but happened well before there was any 
overt Croat-Serb agreement. Although certainly not free from violence (the 
Croat commander of the operation is now on trial in the Hague for alleged 
war crimes), the forced movements of Serbs from Croatia in 1995 was 
nevertheless far less traumatizing and ultimately more stabilizing than the 
ferocious, unagreed ethnic cleansing meted out by the Serbs in Bosnia during 
1992-5. Id. 
However, this analogy fails when one considers that massive displacement 
characterized by the Balkan wars, that is not the case in Iraq: though there are 
certainly a great deal of displaced Iraqis, the displacement is not near the 
magnitude experience in the Balkans. Compare BOGDAN IVANISEVIC, LEGACY OF 
WAR: MINORITY RETURNS IN THE BALKANS (2004), http://hrw.org/wr2k4/16.htm 
(providing numbers of persons displaced by conflicts in the Balkans, including up 
to 350,000 refugees from Croatia, 2.2 million refugees and internally displaced 
persons from Bosnia, and 230,000 refugees from Kosovo, and noting that most 
displaced persons have not returned home), with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ: 
FROM A FLOOD TO A TRICKLE 2 (2007), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ 
refugees/iraq0407/iraq0407.pdf (estimating that 2 million Iraqis have fled their 
homes since the United States’ invasion of Iraq). When considered as a percentage 
of their populations, the Balkans conflict produced a displacement of 
approximately twenty-five percent of the population, while only about seven 
percent of Iraqis are displaced. 
 146. Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War, supra note 6, at 79 
(concluding that to use prevention of future ethnic wars as a rationale for partition 
is, at best, erroneous); BRENDAN O’LEARY, CENTRE FOR INT’L BORDERS 
RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 28: DEBATING PARTITION: JUSTIFICATIONS AND 
CRITIQUES 17-19 (2006), available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/WPpdffiles/ 
MFWPpdf/w28_bol.pdf [hereinafter O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION] (suggesting 
that past partitions actually led to more violence). 
 147. Sambanis, supra note 6, at 69. 
 148. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE CYPRUS STALEMATE: WHAT 
NEXT? 1-2 (2006), http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr/WPpdffiles/MFWPpdf/w28_bol.pdf 
[hereinafter THE CYPRUS STALEMATE] (noting also that prior to the partition, 
intercommunal violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots led to the forced 
displacement of 30,000 Turkish Cypriots from mixed areas into enclaves). 
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from violence and to enforce the ceasefire between the two sides,149 
while Turkey maintains a military force of some 30,000 troops in 
Northern Cyprus for similar purposes.150 The ethno-sectarian 
division of Cyprus also necessitated fiscal intervention, as Northern 
Cyprus, which is not recognized internationally as a sovereign state, 
lags behind Southern Cyprus economically and relies on annual 
budgetary support from Turkey.151 One recent report found that the 
isolation of the Northern Cypriot community following the division 
resulted in losses of over $112,000 (USD) for every Northern 
Cypriot, totaling more than $25 billon in losses to the Northern 
Cypriot economy.152
The division of Palestine also did not end conflict in the region, 
which saw wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973.153 Instead, the division of 
Palestine and the accompanying conflict led to over 16,000 deaths 
and the displacement of over 1.25 million Palestinians and Jews.154 
The United Nations created the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to alleviate the plight 
of Palestinians displaced by the partition. In 2006 alone, the UN 
spent $598.7 million providing relief to 4.3 million Palestinian 
refugees.155
 149. See id. at 1 (acknowledging that the circumstances have changed since the 
force was originally deployed in 1964); see also Cyprus – UNFICYP – 
Background: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter UNFICYP] (describing the mission of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus as the maintenance of the military status quo). 
 150. Turkey affirms anti-Cyprus stance for EU talks, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 
3, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/02/news/turkey.php. 
 151. See THE CYPRUS STALEMATE, supra note 148, at 2 (explaining that because 
Northern Cyprus is so economically dependent on Turkey, it has also fallen victim 
to Turkey’s economic inflation and instability). 
 152. Research Study Reveals the Turkish Cypriots Continue to Suffer Heavily 
Under International Isolations, BAYRAK RADIO TELEVISION CO., Apr. 27, 2008, 
http://www.brtk.cc/index.php/cat/2/news/31160 (referring to a report by Dr. Omer 
Gokcekus which noted that much of this lost revenue is the result of international 
embargoes) (report on file with author). 
 153. See O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 18 (describing 
these conflicts as part of the domino effect that occurs after a partition). 
 154. See id. at 17 (clarifying that many of the displaced Jews were expelled from 
surrounding Arab states). 
 155. U.N. Relief and Works Agency, Report of the Commissioner-General of 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East, ¶¶ 1, 64, U.N. Doc. A/62/13 (Aug. 1, 2007) [hereinafter UNRWA Report] 
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Since their 1947 partition, India and Pakistan have fought three 
wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971 and maintain a contentious 
relationship over Kashmir.156 When India was partitioned, and 
Pakistan created, separating Hindus and Muslims engaged in 
widespread communal violence, 20 million people were displaced 
and between 500,000 and 1 million were killed.157 Since the 
partition, the two states have fallen into a violent dispute over the 
territory of Kashmir, and India has maintained an estimated 600,000 
troops in its portion of the region to enforce the ceasefire between the 
sides.158
Following their division in 1991, Eritrea and Ethiopia launched a 
border war,159 with tens of thousands dying.160 More than 300,000 
troops remain along an 800-kilometer border between the two 
states,161 and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
maintains over 1,600 peacekeeping troops to enforce the ceasefire 
between the two states.162 In April of 2008, UN Secretary General 
(adding that the agency is one of the UN’s largest programs). 
 156. See O’LEARY, DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 18 (noting that 
these conflicts are another example of the domino effect of violence following 
ethnic partitioning). 
 157. Sumantra Bose, Decolonization and State Building in South Asia, J. INT’L 
AFF., Fall 2004, at 95, 96 (adding that many of the Indian freedom fighters saw the 
division of the country as “the antithesis of the ideals for which they” were 
fighting); see also Joya Chatterji, ‘Dispersal’ and the Failure of Rehabilitation: 
Refugee Camp-Dwellers and Squatters in West Bengal, 41 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 995, 
997-98 (2007) (estimating that 15 million people were displaced in the four months 
immediately following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947); O’LEARY, 
DEBATING PARTITION, supra note 146, at 17 (indicating that the number of killed 
may be as high as 2 million). 
 158. See Time to Go, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2007, at 14 (arguing that India should 
reduce its troop presence in Kashmir because it is disproportionate to the threat of 
insurgency and because the troops have committed human rights violations against 
Kashmiris). 
 159. Sambanis, Possible and Impossible Solutions  supra note 6, at 69. 
 160. UN Fears New Ethiopia-Eritrea War, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7341833.stm (noting that this number represents 
only the border violence between 1998-2000). 
 161. GlobalSecurity.org, Military: Ethiopia/Eritrea War, http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/eritrea.htm (last visited June 29, 2008); see 
also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: STOPPING THE SLIDE 
TO WAR 1 (2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3170&tid= 
5136&l=1 (estimating that Ethiopia maintains 100,000 troops on the border). 
 162. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Facts and Figures, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/facts.html (last visited Sept. 6, 
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Ban Ki-Moon warned the Security Council that the withdrawal of 
UN forces would be accompanied by a resumption of hostilities.163
In Bosnia & Herzegovina, ethnic violence also caused the 
displacement of two million people.164 Some trace much of this 
violence to the Vance-Owen plan, which proposed partitioning 
Bosnia into ethnically based cantons, and permitting Serbian regions 
to de facto confederate with Serbia.165 The Vance-Owen plan was 
also the catalyst for conflict between the Bosnian-Croats and the 
Bosnian government, as they struggled to expand their territories, 
capture the land promised to them under the plan, and cleanse it of 
all other ethnic groups.166 This cantonization process led to the 
commission of so many atrocities that UN Special Rapporteur for 
Human Rights Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecke, resigned in July 1995 charging that the UN and 
International Community’s failure to make any serious efforts to stop 
the atrocities in Bosnia made it impossible for him to continue.167
As these instances of prior state practice illustrate, historical 
ethno-sectarian divisions failed to mitigate violence and cost all 
parties involved much more in terms of military and financial 
2008) (enumerating the UN military personnel in Ethiopia and Eritrea and their 
tenure through January 31, 2008). 
 163. UN Fears New Ethiopia-Eritrea War, supra note 160 (noting that the UN 
has already withdrawn most of its forces after Eritrea cut off supplies to the 
mission). 
 164. See Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Resolution 1035, ¶ 17, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1996/210 
(Mar. 29, 1996) (reporting that UNHCR had formulated plans to assist Bosnia & 
Herzegovina with the return of its two million refugees and displaced persons). 
 165. PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR 
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 24 (2002)  
(explaining that the Vance-Owen plan sought to achieve peace by ratifying the 
aims of the campaigns of ethnic cleansing and legitimizing the anti-multicultural 
nationalism propagated by the Serbian and Croatian regimes). 
 166. Id. at 140; COLONEL BOB STEWART, BROKEN LIVES: A PERSONAL VIEW OF 
THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT (1994); LEE BRYANT, THE BETRAYAL OF BOSNIA 42-44 
(1993), available at http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/PDF/Bryant%20-%20The% 
20Betrayal%20of%20Bosnia.pdf (providing a comprehensive assessment of the 
cantonization proposals and implementation); see generally MLADEN KLEMENČIĆ, 
TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR IN BOSNIA-
HERCEGOVINA (Martin Pratt & Clive Schofield eds., 1994) (reviewing the  
numerous proposals for the territorial division of Bosnia). 
 167. WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 140; Balkan Action Council,  
Balkan Watch Week in Review, July 31, 1996. 
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support. There is no reason to expect the ethno-sectarian division of 
Iraq would be any different. 
F. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
The Iraqi Constitution’s provisions relating to the formation of 
regions is likely to make the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq nearly 
impossible. In order to form three ethno-sectarian based regions 
within Iraq, whether through partition or ethno-sectarian based 
federalism, Iraqis would need to assimilate multiple governorates in 
the desired area. The Iraqi Constitution, however, contains specific 
mechanisms by which one or more governorates may reorganize into 
autonomous regions.168 Governorates may create a region by either 
(1) “[the] request by one-third (1/3) of the council members of each 
governorate intending to form a region” or (2) “[the] request by one-
tenth (1/10) of the voters in each of the governorates intending to 
form a region.”169 Article 127 of the Iraqi Constitution sets the voting 
threshold for passing a referendum at a majority of voters.170 Since 
most Iraqis oppose ethno-sectarian division, it seems unlikely that 
plans for the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq could overcome either 
of the tests laid out in the Iraqi Constitution.171
Additionally, a great hurdle exists to the formation of a region of 
more than one governorate in which competing views or visions for 
 168. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 115 (setting out a referendum procedure by 
which one or more governorates may seek organization into a region). 
 169. Id. 
 170. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 127 (qualifying the majority rule for referenda as 
the general rule unless otherwise stipulated). 
 171. See Stephen Zunes, Support for Iraq Partition: Cynical and Dangerous, 
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4639  
(asserting that most Iraqis who support creating a federal system advocate a  
process based on geography rather than ethnicity and religion); see also Ned 
Parker & Raheem Salman, A Divided Iraq Unites Against Partition Plan, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A4 (reporting that Iraq’s normally divided leadership  
unitedly denounced a non-binding U.S. resolution endorsing decentralization 
through the creation of semi-autonomous regions); Iraqi TV Channels Carry  
Reactions to US Senate Resolution, supra note 48 (quoting Iraqi political analysts, 
politicians and spokesmen for various groups as denouncing the U.S. call for  
partition as a violation of the Iraqi Constitution and misunderstanding of the 
country’s history and current political climate.); 2007 POLL, supra note 47, at 13  
(finding that ninety-eight percent of the Iraqi population oppose separation along 
sectarian lines.). 
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the region exist.172 In such a situation, the Law on Formation of 
Regions provides that in the case of competing initiatives, a pre-
referendum poll will be held in each governorate to decide which 
regional vision will be put to the vote in a referendum.173 “In order to 
succeed, a federal initiative must win this stage in every governorate 
concerned, and then receive an absolute majority in the subsequent 
referendum—again in each of the governorates targeted in the 
regional initiative.”174 With such a high standard (consensus of a 
majority in each governorate as to the vision of the region), the great 
public opposition to ethno-sectarian division, and in light of the 
diversity of the proposed regions, a constitutionally valid formation 
of three ethno-sectarian based regions is highly unlikely. 
G. THE EMERGING PILLARS OF  
CONSENSUS BASED GOVERNANCE 
Given the relative flood of legislation passed in February of 2008, 
the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq would fail to capitalize on the 
emerging political cooperation. As Jason Gluck of the United States 
Institute of Peace adeptly observed, “February 13 may . . . be 
remembered as the day when issue-politics rose above ethnic and 
sectarian ideology.”175 On February 13, 2008, Iraqi politics “moved 
to a new level” by achieving two compromises necessary to pass 
three laws (Provincial Powers Law, Amnesty Law, and 2008 
Budget).176 First, the linking of the three laws reflected compromise 
from all parties. Generally speaking, the Kurds prioritized revenue 
distribution, the Sunnis the Amnesty law, and the Shi’a the 
provincial powers law (though there were conflicting positions 
 172. Law of the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of Regions 
(2006) (Iraq), arts. 3, 4 available at http://www.ncciraq.org/spip.php?article2422. 
 173. Id. art. 4, Second (b). 
 174. Visser & Stansfield, supra note 63, at 18 (emphasis added); see also Iraq, 
Law on Formation of Regions, art. 6. 
 175. JASON GLUCK, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, FROM GRIDLOCK TO 
COMPROMISE: HOW THREE LAWS COULD BEGIN TO TRANSFORM IRAQI POLITICS 
(2008), http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0319_iraqi_politics 
.html. 
 176. See id. (describing how the passage of the three independently significant 
laws, the result of concessions and compromise among the parties, revealed a new 
period in the Iraqi political dynamics). 
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among the Shi’a groups).177 Second, by bundling the three laws 
together the parties found a “creative and unprecedented” means of 
achieving accord in Iraqi politics.178
The compromises of February 13, 2008, though momentous, are 
not an anomaly in Iraqi politics. Prior compromises reflect the ability 
of Iraqis to work together and often go unnoticed or unannounced by 
those proposing the ethno-division of Iraq. In October of 2006, 
Sunnis, Sadrists, and secularists joined to temporarily block passage 
of the Law on the Executive Procedures to Form Regions.179 In 
“response to the June 13, 2007 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in 
Samarra” various ethnic and sectarian leaders made unified 
statements “condemning the act and calling for calm.”180 In January 
2008, a coalition of ten Shi’a and Sunni political parties formed the 
National Understanding Project in an effort to block certain Kurdish 
ambitions for decentralization. 
In passing these three laws, “Iraqi politicians learned they could 
reach consensus on a broad range of issues where resolution of any 
one would have been difficult if not impossible standing alone.”181 
Though it is conceded that these signs of political compromise and 
reduced friction are limited, they provide “cautious hope, that a new 
political culture is beginning to take root in Iraq—one based not on 
pure power politics, but a principled respect for the rule of law.”182
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE: MODERN  
MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERALISM 
Given our analysis as set forth above, our position is that the 
political future of Iraq is a federal structure based on existing 
 177. See id. (detailing each of the major ethnicities’ priorities: the Kurds 
receiving seventeen percent of the national revenue, the Sunnis obtaining the 
release of thousands of detainees, and the Shi’a providing limited autonomy for 
provinces with a deadline for provincial elections). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Law of the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of Regions 
(2006) (Iraq). 
 180. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MEASURING STABILITY AND 
SECURITY IN IRAQ: SEPTEMBER 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2007), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Signed-Version-070912.pdf. 
 181. GLUCK, supra note 175. 
 182. Id. 
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political and legal structures and respectful of the complex history of 
Iraq. The Iraqi Constitution, despite all its failings and 
inconsistencies, provided Iraqis with the opportunity to rebuild their 
homeland from the ground up, together, and with a common vision 
in mind. Therefore much of what this Article proposes builds upon 
existing legal infrastructure, and the significant progress that has 
been made in ratifying the Constitution and subsequently passing the 
formation of regions and provincial powers laws. 
The plan set forth herein asserts the fundamental position that the 
future of Iraq is better served by a federalist structure based upon an 
18 governorate model as set forth in the Constitution. The sub-
federal boundaries are already drawn; Iraqis are in a position to 
devolve appropriate power to these entities in an asymmetric and 
gradual manner. Concurrent with the power devolution, Iraq would 
benefit from the development of a system of resource and revenue 
distribution so as to ensure fair and equitable growth and prosperity 
across the federation. Coordination mechanisms such as framework 
legislation and dispute resolution committees would also be 
necessary. In order to respect the complex and diverse identities of 
Iraqis, safeguards need be established to protect the rights of sub-
federal entities and Iraq’s many minorities. 
A. FEDERALIST STRUCTURE WITH  
EIGHTEEN GOVERNORATES 
Iraq presently has a federalist structure with eighteen governorates 
as set forth in the Constitution.183 Federations are states with multi-
tiered governments that involve a combination of shared rule by 
central and regional government institutions as provided in the 
Constitution.184 Each government tier rules over different matters, 
and neither is subordinate to the other.185 Importantly, the original 
motivation for a federalist structure comprised of the eighteen 
existing Iraqi governorates was that it would ensure that no unit 
 183. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 112. 
 184. See id. art. 110 (detailing the list of powers to be shared between the federal 
and regional authorities). 
 185. See id. art. 107 (listing the federal government’s exclusive powers); id. art. 
111 (reserving all powers not under exclusive federal control to the regional 
authorities). 
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making up the federation would be dominated by any one ethnic 
group.186
Both the 2005 Iraqi Constitution and the 2008 Provincial Powers 
Law establish a federal structure with a strong central government. 
Article 1 of the Constitution provides that, “[t]he Republic of Iraq is 
a single, independent federal State with full sovereignty.”187 Article 
106 also obligates the Iraqi government to maintain Iraq’s 
democratic federal system.188 According to the 2008 Provincial 
Powers Law, which took effect following the October 1, 2008 
provincial council elections, provinces may “adopt local legislation 
 . . . in a manner that enables [them] to run [their] affairs according to 
the administrative decentralization principle and in a way that does 
not contradict the Constitution and the federal laws.”189 John 
McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, authors of The Future of Kurdistan 
in Iraq, have described the present structure: 
Iraq’s Constitution actually eschews both the one-size-fits-all 
preference of the integrationists and the inclination of the 
three-regions advocates, in favor of a bespoke, flexible, or 
voluntarily asymmetrical federation tailored to whatever 
(legitimate) preferences exist, or come to exist, among Iraq’s 
democratic constituencies. In this respect, the Constitution 
takes a liberal consociational approach that is focused on 
democratic preferences rather than on predetermined ethnic 
or communal categories.190
The goal of the Iraqi federal structure may be best served by a 
balance of shared and self-rule. The federal structure must 
accommodate the need for robust central government power and 
 186. BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN MCGARRY, CONSTITUTION BUILDING AND 
FEDERAL OPTIONS IN IRAQ: THE KURDISH CHALLENGE, available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LHON-6AQCGW 
?OpenDocument [hereinafter O’LEARY & MCGARRY, CONSTITUTION BUILDING]. 
 187. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 1. 
 188. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 106 (requiring that “[t]he federal authorities shall 
preserve the unity, integrity, independence and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal 
democratic system”). 
 189. Provincial Powers Law, art. 2 (Iraq), available at http://www.washington 
institute.org/html/newsletterImages/DraftProvincialPowersLawForWeb.pdf. 
 190. John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal 
Consociation as Political Prescription, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 679, 686-87 (2007) 
[hereinafter McGarry & O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005]. 
SIMPSON-WILLIAMS_TO PRINT.DOC 12/4/2008  12:03:18 PM 
2008] RETHINKING THE POLITICAL FUTURE 229 
 
resources to manage Iraqi diversity and avoid a self-destructing civil 
war. The state structure could also be designed to accommodate the 
territorial-based identities of most Iraqis and their legitimate desire to 
maintain control over local issues. According to one commentator: 
“[s]afety and stability are more likely to be found, not by locking in 
on and privileging these three communal identities, but by 
structuring a federation that is, as far as possible, permissive—by 
building a federal system that permits many forms of identity, 
including the national, to achieve expression.”191
As the Public International Law & Policy Group previously noted 
in a report jointly published with The Century Foundation, the 
primary advantage of a federal system is that it is appropriate for 
states with “a diverse and pluralistic population with a desire to 
maintain national unity,” such as Iraq.192 “In a federal structure 
comprised of numerous constituent units, the diverse groups will 
have some stake in the central government and may be able to 
protect and promote their interests through effective 
representation.”193 Federal governments also tend to promote 
moderate leaders who “must appeal to a broad political base because 
such structures group villages and municipalities into larger 
constituent units.”194
Iraqi federalism could relatively easily be based upon the eighteen 
governorate structure already provided for in the Iraq Constitution. 
Federations with fewer regions (two or three) are less stable than 
those with many.195 While two-region federations are prone to 
collapse,196 three-unit federations are also fragile, as “opportunities 
 191. David Cameron, Making Federalism Work, in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW 
GENERATION OF CONFLICT 153, 159 (Markus E. Bouillon, David M. Malone & 
Ben Roswell eds., 2007). 
 192. Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure, 39 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 53, 68-69 (2003). 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 113-14 (1999) 
[hereinafter WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS] (explaining that federal 
systems with fewer regions, in particular bipolar federations, are unstable because 
each region is generally given veto powers over all matters, often leading to 
impassable deadlocks). 
 196. McGarry & O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005, supra note 190, at 679 
(“[A]s the experience of Czechoslovakia, pre-1971 Pakistan, and, more recently, 
Serbia and Montenegro suggests, because there are few opportunities for shifting 
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for shifting coalitions are still limited.”197 According to Keith Mines, 
a former US Special Forces Officer and founding member of the 
Council on Emerging National Security Affairs “[t]he only way 
[Iraq] can be functional over the long term is if it is organized around 
a federation model for its [eighteen] governorates, which breaks 
down confessional groups (e.g., Shi’a, Sunni) at the local level, 
leading to provincial political identification that facilitates national 
unity.”198 Under the system of eighteen governorates, Iraqis are more 
free to associate politically as they see fit, rather than having political 
identities and units forced upon them based on ethno-sectarian 
identities. 
In implementing the eighteen governorates structure, it may be 
necessary to give attention to the negative connotation many Iraqis 
apply to the term federalism. Carole O’Leary of American University 
makes the point that public sentiment among Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis 
over Iraqi federalism is obfuscated by Kurdish efforts for increased 
autonomy.199 According to former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari, a 
common Iraqi perspective is that federalism is solely related to the 
Kurdish region in the north of Iraq.200 Noah Feldman of Harvard 
Law School also observed that following the coalition takeover of 
Iraq, “federalism negotiations were always about the balance 
between the Kurds’ regional government and the federal authorities 
in Baghdad . . . .”201 Federalism was thus interpreted by some as a 
politically acceptable way of preserving a unified Iraq while 
 
alliances and the two units tend to be pitted against each other on every issue.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Keith W. Mines, After the Surge: Toward an 18-State Federation, FOREIGN 
SERV. J., Mar. 2008, at 22, 23. 
 199. Carole O’Leary, Research Professor, American University School of 
International Service, Remarks at the American University International Law 
Review and Public International Law and Policy Group Symposium, Rethinking 
the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq (Feb. 11, 2008) (transcript on file with the 
American University International Law Review) 
 200. Interview by Jane Corbin with Ibrahim Jaafari, Prime Minister in Iraq 
(Mar. 18, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/ 
4820858.stm (contending that the idea of federalism in Iraq generally related to the 
Kurdistan region and became an agreed upon constitutional reality). 
 201. Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, 
at A19. 
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recognizing Kurdish autonomy,202 while other saw it as a “Kurdish 
ploy” for independence deserving great skepticism.203
B. DEVOLVE POWER 
Critical to the sustainability of the political and economic stability 
of the state is for power to be transferred from the central 
government to the governorates. Key to maintaining this stability is 
ensuring that power is devolved only where appropriate, 
asymmetrically, and in a gradual manner that is consistent with each 
governorate’s ability to accept such powers.204
1. Devolution of Power Only Where Appropriate205
The Iraqi Constitution already achieves a great deal in determining 
where devolution is appropriate. As such, the Constitution, 
augmented by the provincial powers law, could be the foundation for 
the devolution of power in Iraq. The Constitution provides for the 
powers of regions or governorates.206 Specifically, Article 111 
provides that any powers not clearly granted to the federal 
government are reserved for the regions or governorates.207 
Additionally, Article 110 provides for concurrent powers between 
the federal government and sub-federal governments including 
customs management, electric energy and its distribution, 
 202. Id. 
 203. Nimrod Raphaeli, Kurdistan – The Quest for Statehood, KURDISTAN 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, (reporting that the new political leaders who had previously 
promised to support the Kurdish cause while serving as opposition to the Saddam 
Hussein regime, reneged on their promises and viewed the issue of federalism as it 
pertained to the Kurdish region as one in need of “multiple revisions”). 
 204. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Islamism, Nationalism and Sectarianism, in IRAQ: 
PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 71, 84 (Markus E. Bouillon, David 
M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) (noting that the devolution of power in Iraq 
should be done in a way that is “consensus-based, accommodative, participatory, 
and equitable in terms of power and resource sharing for the various Iraqi 
communities and regions.”). 
 205. See PAUL R. WILLIAMS, MATTHEW T. SIMPSON & CHRISTINA J. SHEETZ, 
PEACE AGREEMENT DRAFTING GUIDE: DARFUR (Public International Law and 
Policy Group 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078714 (providing a 
more thorough consideration of the core elements of political devolution). 
 206. IRAQ CONSTITUTION arts. 107, 111. 
 207. Id. art. 111. 
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environmental policy, development and planning policies, public 
health policy, public education policy, and water resource policy.208 
Though Article 110 describes these powers as concurrent (to be 
shared between the federal government and the sub-federal entities), 
Article 111 provides that in the event of a dispute over these 
concurrent powers, the governorate or region’s law shall receive 
priority.209 This implicitly gives the regions or governorates not 
organized into a region control over the Article 114 powers. The 
Provincial Powers law augments the Constitution by granting 
governorates direct authority over local security,210 allowing 
governorate officials to “oversee and inspect public facilities in the 
province (other than courts, military units, universities, colleges, and 
institutions)” and giving the officials of the governorate limited 
“input into the appointment of senior ministry officials in the 
province . . . allows them to dismiss such officials by an absolute 
majority vote in the provincial council.”211
Though devolving a good deal of power to the regions and 
governorates, the Iraqi Constitution also provides the federal 
government in Baghdad with relatively robust controls. The authority 
provided to the central government in Article 109 to “preserve the 
unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal 
democratic system” is broad and provides a foundation for a 
federalist system with a strong central government.212 Several of 
Article 110’s exclusive federal powers (national security, fiscal 
policy, national budget, interstate commerce) support a strong 
national government within a federation.213 Consistent with this 
strong central government, the Provincial Powers Law grants the 
Council of Representatives the power to remove provincial 
 208. Id. art. 110. 
 209. Id. arts. 110, 111. 
 210. Provincial Powers Law, art. 31 (Iraq) (authorizing the Governor of each 
governorate to control local security agencies and departments charged with 
protection, conservation and order); see also IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117(5) 
(granting regional governments the power to organize their own security forces 
and other regional administrative matters). 
 211. GLUCK, supra note 175. See Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 31.4 (Iraq) 
(imparting section over most public facilities with the Governor of the region); see 
also Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 7.9 (Iraq). 
 212. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 109; Cameron, supra note 191, at 163. 
 213. Cameron, supra note 191, at 163. 
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governors and dissolve provincial councils, and allows the Council 
of Ministers to remove other senior provincial officials.214 Provincial 
revenue is also derived largely from allocations from the federal 
budget.215 Additionally, the prohibition against contradicting federal 
laws protects the strength of the central government, as any 
provincial attempt to modify federal ministerial regulation is 
voidable as contradicting federal law.216
Federal control over foreign affairs (including the armed services 
and national security), monetary policy, customs and duties, 
communications, interregional transportation, debt management, 
immigration and naturalization, and management of the national 
economy is consistent with state practice.217 Likewise, providing for 
sub-federal control over education, health, social welfare, police 
powers, local taxes, and regional transportation is also consistent 
with state practice.218 Article 111 of the Iraqi Constitution reserves 
 214. GLUCK, supra note 175; Provincial Powers Law, 2008, art. 20.2 (Iraq) 
(stating that “[t]he Council of Representatives may dissolve the Council by 
absolute majority upon the request of the Governor or one third of the Governorate 
Council”). 
 215. Provincial Powers Law, art. 44 (Iraq) (stating that the Governorates 
financial resources consist of, inter alia, the budget granted by the Federal 
Government); GLUCK, supra note 175 (observing that “[t]he Provincial Powers 
Law bestows no tax power upon the provinces, but does grant undefined authority 
to levy local fees and fines, and generate revenue from services and investment 
projects, as well as grants and donations.”). 
 216. See GLUCK, supra note 175 (asserting that the proscription against adopting 
local legislation that contradicts federal laws is a key limitation on provincial 
authority, as almost every federal ministry has or will have statutes granting them 
authority to regulate within their respective spheres, thereby limiting provincial 
ability to modify ministerial regulations). 
 217. Internationally, many nations have taken a similar approach to federal 
control. See, e.g., CONST. OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 1995, art. III; 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.), Aug. 30, 2001, available at 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/Melanesia/documents/bougainville/PDF/BougainvillePeace
Agreement29Aug01.pdf; CONSTITUTION § 51 (Austl.); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] 
[Constitution] art. 73 (F.R.G.); COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 117 
(Italy); CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF THE STATE UNION OF SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO art. 19; Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 
[BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, arts. 54, 58, 60, 61, 65 (Switz.). 
 218. Regional governments are delegated similar powers in many nations. See, 
e.g., Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.); CONST. (1987), Art. X, (Phil.); 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 Schedule 5. The Constitution of South Africa also 
specifically lists concurrent powers. Id. Schedule 4. 
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unnamed powers to the regional and governorate governments.219 
The architects of the Iraqi Constitution designed a power sharing 
structure that is effective and sufficiently nuanced to account for the 
diversity of the eighteen governorates and their people. 
2. Asymmetric Devolution 
Often following violent conflicts, provinces lack the ability to 
govern effectively, yet creation of provincial governments seems 
necessary for political stability. A phased and asymmetric approach 
to the assumption of powers by sub-federal governments thus 
provides crucial time to build capacity and infrastructure.220 In states 
 219. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 111; Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C, No. 5 (Appendix 1985), art. 91 (Can.) (“. . . the 
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters 
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to  
say . . . [cl. 29] Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the 
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the 
Legislatures of the Provinces.”); INDIA CONST. art. 246, cl. 97 (“Any other matter 
not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of 
those Lists.”); LAWS OF MALAYSIA [Constitution] art. 77 (“The Legislature of a 
State shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in 
any of the Lists set out in the Ninth Schedule, not being a matter in respect of 
which Parliament has power to make laws.”). But see BUNDES-
VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] art. 15(1) (Austria) (“Insofar as a 
matter is not expressly transferred by the Federal Constitution to the legislation or 
also the execution of the Federation, it remains in the independent competence of 
the Länder.”); Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution], art. 25(1) (Braz.) 
(“Powers not forbidden to them by this Constitution are reserved to the States.”); 
GG art. 70(1) (F.R.G.) (“The Länder [States] shall have the right to legislate 
insofar as this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation.”); 
COST. (Italy) art. 117 (“The regions have the legislative power with respect to any 
matter not expressly reserved to the legislation of the State.”); CONSTITUTION Art. 
4(7) (2005) (Nig.) (“The House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with 
respect to the following matters, that is to say: (a) any matter not included in the 
Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution.”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Konst. RF] [Constitution] 
art. 73 (Russ.) (“Outside the limits of authority of the Russian Federation and of 
the powers of the Russian Federation on issues falling under the joint jurisdiction 
of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation, the subjects of 
the Russian Federation shall possess the plenitude of State power.”). 
 220. For example, the 2001 peace agreement between Bougainville and Papua 
New Guinea provides for a gradual devolution of powers from the central 
government to the autonomous Bougainville government “taking full account of 
needs and capacity.” Bougainville Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.) art. 101. Also, 
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where different sub-federal governments assume different powers 
over time, the characteristics of gradual devolution vary in terms of 
the criteria applied and evaluation of progress.221
The devolution of power in Iraq described above provides for the 
asymmetrical allocation of power and responsibility to ensure fair 
participation of each of the eighteen governorates and to respect the 
Kurdish region’s constitutionally-provided status as a region.222 
Article 114.4 of the Iraqi Constitution also provides for the 
asymmetric distribution of revenue to the governorates and regions 
based upon their resources and needs.223
Given the varied governorate capacity levels, each governorate is 
in a different position to provide services and assume powers 
devolved from the federal government. Similarly, the governorates 
have different priorities, with some concerned with control of oil 
fields and others concerned with control of electric power grids.224 
Devolving power asymmetrically allows the central government to 
accommodate the governorates’ differing preferences, while ensuring 
that the governorates’ power and control of resources are shared 
among them. Of course, the determination of the share of each power 
allocated to each governorate will be challenging, but the ability of 
Iraqi legislators to craft solutions to difficult problems was evidenced 
by their ability to simultaneously pass three key pieces of benchmark 
legislation on February 13, 2008.225
in Spain, the Autonomous Communities can elect which powers they want to have 
within constitutionally-defined limits. CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] art. 148 (Spain). 
Further, if the Autonomous Communities cannot meet their obligations, the central 
government may take steps to compel the Autonomous Communities to fulfill their 
obligations. Id. art. 155. 
 221. See, e.g., C.E. art. 148 (Spain) (outlining some twenty-two categories over 
which Autonomous Communities may have jurisdiction including municipal 
boundaries, planning and housing within townships, recreational ports, airports, 
woodlands, agriculture, inland fishing, local fairs, museums, and social assistance). 
 222. See VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA, USAID, LAW ON THE EXECUTIVE 
PROCEDURES FOR REGION FORMATION: AN ANALYSIS (2007), available at 
http://www.lgp-iraq.org/publications/index.cfm?fuseaction=throwpub&ID=163 
(suggesting that the unique consideration of the Kurdish area as its own region is 
reflective of the asymmetrical federalism enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution). 
 223. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 109 (stating that resources will be distributed 
proportionate to the population). 
 224. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the tension between governorates over 
natural resources in Iraq). 
 225. See supra Part III.G (recognizing the significance of the agreements 
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C. RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION 
Iraq’s natural resources must be distributed equitably to allow 
prosperity throughout the nation.226 The Iraqi Constitution recognizes 
this need to allocate resources fairly,227 and Iraq’s leaders could build 
upon the constitutional framework to develop a strong resource 
distribution scheme. The current situation in Iraq is unfortunate, with 
intra-governmental infighting over control of oil, water and 
electricity.228
The Iraqi Constitution provides that oil and gas resources belong 
to all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates,229 and 
that the revenues shall be distributed in a fair manner in all parts of 
the country to ensure balanced development throughout Iraq.230 The 
federal government, in cooperation with the oil producing 
governorates and regions, is charged with managing oil and gas 
extracted from current fields, provided that it allocates the wealth “in 
a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts 
of the country.”231
Currently, the Ministry of Electricity oversees the production and 
distribution of Iraq’s electric power.232 However, the production of 
electricity requires oil to fuel its generators, so the Ministry of 
Electricity must work with the Ministry of Oil. However, the two 
ministries do not always cooperate, and the Ministry of Oil’s focus 
reached by the Iraqi legislators over issues that have been the source of tension 
between the governorates). 
 226. See Nicholas “Fink” Haysom, Forging an Inclusive Social Contract, in 
IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 143, 146 (Markus E. 
Bouillon, David M. Malone & Ben Roswell eds., 2007) (arguing that the Iraqi 
constitution should reflect the country’s need to distribute natural resources fairly). 
 227. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117.3 (“Regions and governorates shall be 
allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their 
responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their own resources, needs and size 
of their population.”). 
 228. See Mohammed A Salih, Iraqis Fight Over Oil Spoils, ASIA TIMES, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ26Ak01.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2008) (emphasizing the crisis over control of oil and other 
resources by the segregated regions in Iraq). 
 229. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 108. 
 230. See id. art 117.3. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Ministry of Electricity Official Website, http://www.moelc.gov.iq/ 
default_en.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). 
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on exporting oil to raise Iraqi revenues has led to a shortage of oil 
available in Iraq to fuel power plants,233 causing power plants to shut 
down.234
Furthermore, even when power plants in the governorates are 
operating, the electricity that they generate must be transmitted to 
Baghdad.235 In the past, Saddam Hussein redirected much of Iraq’s 
electricity into Baghdad, leaving much of rural Iraq without  
power.236 Now that the governorates have more control over the 
amount of electricity that they produce, many refuse to share their 
electricity with Baghdad, particularly those governorates in the 
Shi’a-dominated South.237 In addition to depriving Iraqis of 
electricity, government infighting and the governorates’ failure to 
cooperate has impacted Iraq’s water supply.238 Electricity is 
necessary to run water treatment facilities and to pump water through 
pipes in homes.239 With Iraqis having only limited amounts of 
 233. See Glenn Zorpette, Oil and Electricity Ministries Won’t Mix, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 10, 2008, at 6 (discussing the strained relations between the 
Ministers of Oil and Electricity, and explaining that the Minister of Oil has strong 
ties to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a dominant Shiite 
party, while the Minister of Electricity has little political clout). 
 234. C.f. Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations: Rebuilding Iraq, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15019/ 
rebuilding_iraq.html (outlining the wide disparities in the availability of electricity 
in different parts of Iraq, with residents of Kirkuk having up to twelve hours of 
electricity per day and residents of some rural areas having only four hours of 
electricity per day). 
 235. See James Glanz & Stephen Farrell, Militias Seizing Control of Grid, 
Starving Baghdad of Electricity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at A1 (explaining that 
there is no central electricity switching station in Iraq, so the governorates have to 
share their electricity by flipping a switch that would transmit power to Baghdad). 
 236. See id.; Alexandra Zavis, It’s a Power Struggle Every Day, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2008, at A4 (comparing Baghdad’s electricity availability and 
consumption during Hussein’s regime with current trends). 
 237. See Glanz & Farrell, supra note 239 (noting that Sadr’s Mahdi Army has 
had control of the electric power plant in Basra and shut off the power in strategic 
places in Basra as part of his offensive against U.S. and British forces in May 
2007). 
 238. See Iraq: Water Shortage Leads People to Drink from Rivers, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70243 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) 
(explaining that corruption and insecurity among the municipalities is the cause of 
the water shortages in Iraq). 
 239. See Bruno, supra note 234 (noting that although Iraqis’ access to potable 
water has surpassed prewar levels overall, there are still wide disparities in access 
to potable water in different areas of Iraq because of unavailability of electricity). 
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electricity per day, most do not have running water in their homes, 
and much of the water that is available to Iraqi citizens is 
untreated.240
A successful federal structure in Iraq thus requires strong resource 
distribution mechanisms to combat government infighting and to 
ensure that the fairness and equality called for in the Constitution can 
be achieved. One such mechanism is a joint natural resources 
authority charged with regulating the distribution of resources 
between the central and governorate governments. Joint resource 
authorities promote sub-federal participation in the control of certain 
resources within a state as they encourage power sharing between the 
federal and sub-federal governments. A joint natural resource 
authority could include representatives of the federal and governorate 
governments such that it will allow for governorate participation and 
encourage equitable and responsible regulation.241
D. REVENUE SHARING 
A successful federal structure needs fair mechanisms for sharing 
the revenue generated from Iraq’s resources. The need for robust, fair 
and flexible revenue distribution mechanisms is compounded by the 
current economic environment in Iraq. Iraqis face a void of economic 
trade,242 an unemployment and underemployment rate that some 
 240. See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, RISING TO THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE 
IN IRAQ 3 (2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/files/Rising%20to%20the 
%20humanitarian%20challenge%20in%20Iraq.pdf (reporting that seventy percent 
of Iraqis lack access to clean water, and claiming that much of Iraq’s water is 
contaminated from the dumping of sewage into rivers). 
 241. See Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, 1967, c. 8(a) (Austl.) (outlining the 
authority of one of Australia’s multiple joint resources authorities, each composed 
of representatives from the federal government and one province); see also 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord art. 12.03, Can.-N.S., 
Aug. 26, 1986, available at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/regulatory/pdfs/Accord.pdf 
(describing the Canada-Nova Scotia Board of Petroleum Resources as one that 
issues discovery and production licenses, approves development plans, and makes 
decisions regarding operating licenses and authorizations for work). The Board of 
Petroleum Resources has considerable power over certain responsibilities but its 
decisions over other matters are subject to challenge and review by representatives 
of the federal and provincial governments. Id. art. 13. In some instances, the 
provincial minister may alone veto particular decisions of the board. Id. 
 242. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 180, at 10. 
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estimate may be as high as forty percent,243 inflation running over 
seventy percent,244 and fifty-four percent of the population living on 
less than one dollar (U.S.) per day.245 Add to this the fact that more 
than ninety percent of Iraq’s government revenue comes from oil 
exports, but not all governorates have access to oil deposits,246 and 
the picture becomes quite clear: Iraqis need revenue sharing that is 
fair and effective. 
Currently, regions and governorates are entitled to “an equitable 
share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge its 
responsibilities and duties . . . having regard to its resources, needs 
and the percentage of its population”247 A constitutional obligation 
exists to pursue a balanced development strategy through which 
revenues from current fields are distributed fairly.248 Also, as this 
constitutional provision makes clear, the territorial status of the 
Kirkuk governorate has been decoupled from the oil revenues that 
flow from its oilfields. As Kirkuk’s oil comes from currently 
exploited fields, its revenues are to be redistributed across Iraq. 
To augment the constitutional provisions for fair and effective 
revenue distribution, Iraq may consider establishing a fair 
mechanism for the calculation of revenue distribution,249 and 
 243. See UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ, HUMANITARIAN BRIEFING ON THE 
CRISIS IN IRAQ 3 (2007), available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UN-
Iraq%20Humanitarian%20Briefing%20Fact%20Sheet%20May%2007.pdf 
(reporting unemployment between twenty-five and forty percent). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Cordesman, supra note 73 (stating that while the vast majority of Iraq’s 
government revenue comes from oil exports, the Sunni west has no claim to oil 
revenues because they lack developed oil fields). 
 247. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 117. 
 248. See Vanessa Jimenez, Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges on the 
Road Ahead, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 21, 23 (2005) (explaining that the Iraq 
constitution contains “mechanisms” aimed at ensuring equitable and fair 
distribution of the economic benefit of the country’s natural resources). 
 249. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND FINANCE GOVERNMENT OF 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA, SPECIFIC PURPOSE PAYMENTS (SSPS), available at 
http://www.dtf.wa.gov.au/cms/tre_content.asp?id=1909 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter SPECIFIC PURPOSE PAYMENTS] (explaining the variables of the formula 
used to distribute Australia’s Special Purpose Payments). In Australia, the federal 
government collects most of the tax revenue and disburses large transfers to the 
provinces. See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND FINANCE GOVERNMENT OF 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA, COMMONWEALTH GRANTS, available at http://www.dtf.wa 
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procedures for adjusting federal-governorate financial arrangements 
in recognition of the volatility of commodities markets.250 As PILPG 
Senior Peace Fellow Vanessa Jimenez suggested in 2005, “if 
properly implemented and interpreted,” a reformed revenue 
calculation and distribution scheme would allow Kurds and Shi’a “to 
exercise the self-governance that they desire,” while assuring Sunnis 
of their fair share of the national wealth.251
E. COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
The political instability affecting Iraq presents a challenge for 
implementing a successful federal structure. Disorganization and 
distrust permeate throughout all levels of government. To tackle this 
challenge head on, Iraqis could develop several coordination 
mechanisms including framework legislation to transparently and 
clearly delineate governmental responsibilities, committees to 
address government coordination and to settle disputes between 
.gov.au/cms/tre_content.asp?id=1917 (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 
COMMONWEALTH GRANTS]. The Commonwealth Grants Commission recommends 
the amount of general-purpose transfers from the federal government to specific 
provinces using a horizontal fiscal equalization principle, which considers the 
differing costs of providing services in each province. See id. In India, the 
President considers the recommendations of a Finance Commission each year 
before determining what percentage of the net proceeds of any tax each provincial 
government will receive. See INDIA CONST. arts. 269, 270, 275. A consideration of 
which provincial governments paid the tax greatly influences this determination. 
Id. In Austria, the federal government distributes revenue to the regional 
governments based on tax revenue criteria, (regional or local revenue of a tax) and 
demographic criteria (the number of inhabitants of a province). See FEDERAL 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AUSTRIA, FISCAL EQUALIZATION SYSTEM IN AUSTRIA 2, 
available at http://english.bmf.gv.at/Budget/IntergovernmentalFi_252/Fiscal_ 
Equalisation_System.pdf. 
 250. See Ronald L. Watts, Forum of Federations, Processes for Adjusting 
Federal Financial Relations: Examples from Austria and Canada, in FISCAL 
RELATIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES: FOUR ESSAYS 17, 21 (Paul. M. Boothe ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Watts, Forum of Federations] (noting that the federal governments in 
Australia, India, and South Africa establish different forms of standing or periodic 
commissions to analyze their respective distributive formulas, making 
recommendations to parliament when appropriate); see also id. (recognizing that 
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium have parliamentary committees that 
determine financial transfers to the regions). 
 251. See Jimenez, supra note 248, at 23 (interpreting Article 117 of the Iraq 
constitution as a means of providing harmony between the governorates while 
fairly distributing the wealth of the nation). 
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government entities, and finally a mechanism to ensure cross-
government and sectarian dialogue. 
1. Framework Legislation Delineating Governmental 
Responsibilities 
In order to minimize friction between various government 
institutions, Iraq could benefit from a framework of governance that 
will clearly identify the role of the regional and central institutions.252 
Such framework legislation would allow the federal government to 
set forth those powers that are within its exclusive competence 
and/or those powers that may be shared with the governorates.253 
Consistent with this guiding framework, the governorates may then 
adopt implementing policies and legislation.254 Framework 
legislation differs from other federally-enacted laws in that it 
typically provides only a guiding principle or goal that governorate 
governments must adhere to when adopting implementing 
legislation.255 Framework legislation therefore ensures a unified 
federal policy while providing flexibility to the governorates in 
carrying out that policy. 
2. Coordination and Dispute Resolution Committees 
Iraqi federalism could also benefit from the development of 
mechanisms that foster cooperation between the central government 
and governorates in the administration of their exclusive and shared 
 252. See Haysom, supra note 226, at 146 (advocating a more balanced division 
of powers between the federal and regional levels). 
 253. See generally B-VG (Aust.) art. 12 (differentiating the powers delegated to 
Austria’s federal from those delegated to the regional governing bodies). 
 254. See GG (F.R.G.) art. 75 (providing the federal government the power to 
define broad framework legislation which the regions are responsible for 
implementing through their own detailed legislation). Although Article 75 of the 
German Constitution was abrogated in 2006, the provision still establishes a 
feasible framework for Iraq. Id. (mentioning, briefly, the abrogation of Article 75 
during the constitutional reform in 2006). See also B-VG (Aust.) art. 11-14 (listing 
policy areas in which the federal government is responsible for enacting 
framework legislation, while the Länder, or provincial governments, are 
responsible for enacting implementation legislation). 
 255. See B-VG (Aust.) art. 14 (demonstrating that Austria’s constitution 
provides the federal government the power to enact framework legislation but 
limits that power by providing regional bodies the power to implement the 
framework laws). 
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powers, and help increase the level of interaction and connection 
between the levels of government.256 Two such mechanisms may 
include: (1) formal and ad hoc coordination committees;257 and 
(2) joint entities tasked with resolving disputes outside the formal 
judicial system.258 Such committees are within the boundaries of the 
Constitution,259 and would allow the federal and sub-federal 
 256. While the Spanish Constitution allows the National Government and the 
Autonomous Communities to legislate in areas of exclusive competence, the 
National Government also may appoint a representative to serve in the government 
of an Autonomous Community to coordinate administration of National 
Government policies with those of the Autonomous Community. See C.E. art. 69; 
see also id. art. 69 (providing that the Senate, one house of the Cortes Generales 
(the Spanish national legislature), shall represent the interests of the provinces and 
the Autonomous Communities). 
 257. See, e.g., Act on Autonomy of Åland, Ch. 8, available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911144.pdf (providing for the 
Åland Delegation, a joint council that facilitates coordination between the central 
Finnish and Åland Island governments); The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: 
The Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, 1998, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ni/ni4.html#BIIC (creating the British-Irish Inter-
Governmental Conference); Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat 
(CICS) Website, http://www.scics.gc.ca/35years_e.html (describing Canada’s 
annual First Ministers’ Conference that brings together the Canadian Prime 
Minister and the premiers of the provinces). 
 258. See S. AFR. CONST. § 76 (requiring a Mediation Committee consisting of 
both national and provincial delegations to address legislation involving the 
provinces when the two chambers of parliament disagree). If the disagreement is 
not resolved in the Mediation Committee, the legislation in question can only be 
passed by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. See id.; Bougainville 
Peace Agreement (Papua N.G.) arts. 263-67 (creating an intermediary between 
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville to resolve disputes prior to mediation and 
arbitration). If mediation and arbitration fails, the parties can submit their dispute 
to the courts. See id.; The Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No. 577, ch. 1, 1978, 
available at http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=71&n=1&d=1059&s=2 
&str=stor (establishing an ad hoc mediation committee designed to address 
conflicts between the central Danish government and Greenland’s provincial 
governments); Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, ch. 
4, 1999, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-
6599VZ?OpenDocument (developing a Commission which addresses disputes 
regarding resource ownership and allocation); see also Matthew T. Simpson, Iraqi 
High Court Authority: A State-Practice Review of the Source of High Court 
Authority and an Assessment of the Iraq Constitution, ISLAMIC L. & L. OF MUSLIM 
WORLD, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1061101 
#PaperDownload (providing a thorough analysis of the provisions relating to Iraqi 
High Court authority). 
 259. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 105 (providing that “other independent 
commissions may be established according to need and necessity by a law.”). 
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governments to communicate with each other. In the event that a 
dispute were to arise, the dispute resolution committee would 
provide Iraqis with a means for resolving the dispute before sending 
it to the judicial branch. 
F. FEDERAL SAFEGUARDS 
In recognition of the asymmetries of power and diversity that exist 
in modern day Iraq, Iraqis could benefit from the development of 
several safeguards to ensure respect for the rights of both sub-federal 
entities, and the minority populations in those areas. 
1. Commission to Protect the Rights of Regions and Governorates 
The establishment of a commission to protect the rights of regions 
and governorates is essential to stabilizing the political climate in 
Iraq. Article 102 of the Iraq Constitution provides for the 
establishment of a public Commission “to guarantee the rights of the 
regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.”260 This 
Article stipulates that the Commission should include representatives 
from the federal government as well as representatives from the 
governments of the regions and governorates not organized in a 
region.261 According to the Constitution, the Commission’s structure 
and responsibilities are to be defined by law.262
In establishing this Commission, the Iraqi legislature could look to 
several relevant precedents including those found in South Africa, 
Australia, Bahrain, Kenya, Thailand, Lebanon, Yemen, and the 
United Kingdom.263 Comprehensive and realistic objectives for the 
Commission can ensure that its members, the National Government, 
and the Iraqi citizenry have confidence in the Commission’s 
 260. See id. art. 102 (requiring the establishment of a commission that will be 
the voice of regions that are not organized in a manner similar to the governorates). 
 261. See id. (requiring the participation of not only individuals from the region, 
but also representatives from the federal government). 
 262. See id. art. 102-03 (identifying the purpose of the Commission, the 
individuals that will partake in the Commission, and the Commission’s roles). 
 263. It should be noted that these examples often refer to the rights of “local 
governments” (such as district and sub-district governments) rather than higher 
orders of government such as those of the region and governorates. Nevertheless, 
these structures and precedents can be applied to the Commission and the interests 
of Iraq’s regions and governorates not organized in a region. 
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activities. Possible objectives include: (1) supporting democratic 
governance; (2) representing the interests of the governments of the 
regions and governorates not organized in a region at the national 
and international level; (3) improving the capacity of regional and 
governorate government bodies; (4) providing a forum for 
information-sharing; and (5) building relationship with the citizenry. 
2. Commission for the Protection of Minority Rights and Minority 
Rights Ombudsmen 
The Iraqi Constitution provides that, “Iraqis are equal before the 
law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or opinion, or 
economic and social status,”264 and acknowledges that Iraq is “a 
country of many nationalities, religions and sects.”265 Minority 
groups, including the Armenian, Assyrians, Caldeans, and Turkmen, 
are guaranteed specific political, cultural, and educational rights.266
Despite these protections, the political instability in Iraq presents a 
high risk of disenfranchisement and isolation for Iraq’s minorities 
and abuse of their rights. Therefore, efforts should be made to ensure 
that Iraq’s many minorities will be protected regardless of future 
changes to the structure of Iraqi governance and the extent to which 
political and fiscal powers are devolved. As mentioned above, the 
diversity and intermingling of Iraq’s many ethnic populations places 
the Sunni, Shi’a and Kurd in the minority in certain governorates.267 
Minority protections are therefore necessary not only to protect those 
groups currently considered minorities by the Constitution, but also 
those groups that experience majority status in one governorate, and 
minority status in another. 
The government therefore needs mechanisms to ensure the 
representation and protection of minorities. Two of these 
mechanisms include a commission for the protection of minority 
rights and a minority rights ombudsman. Article 99 of the Iraqi 
 264. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 14. 
 265. Id. art. 3; see also Jimenez, supra note 248, at 23 (assessing several of the 
key provisions of the 2005 Iraq Constitution). 
 266. IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 121. 
 267. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the vast ethnic disparity within the 
governorates and urban areas of Iraq). 
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Constitution mandates a High Commission for Human Rights (“High 
Commission”).268 Within this High Commission, a Council or 
Commission for Iraqi Minorities could be established. The purpose 
of a High Commission includes promoting laws aimed at protecting 
human rights and establishing a system of receiving complaints for 
rights violations.269 Similarly, a Commission for Iraqi Minorities 
could focus on promulgating legislation and receiving complaints,270 
as well as ensuring restitution for violations by enumerating the 
rights of oppressed or abused minorities to regain property or pursue 
other forms of redress.271
In addition to, or as part of, an Iraqi commission for the protection 
of minority rights, Iraq may also consider building upon the concept 
of a Minority Ombudsman first articulated in the TAL.272 Article 50 
of the TAL provides for a National Commission for Human Rights, 
 268. See IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 99 (creating multiple “High Commissions” for 
the regulation of human rights and public integrity, monitored by the Council of 
Representatives). 
 269. See The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period [TAL], art. 50 (stating the purpose of the High Commissions and principles 
on which it should be based); see also PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 
GROUP, THE IRAQ FEDERATION COUNCIL: LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING GUIDE (2006), 
available at http://www.pilpg.org/areas/peacebuilding/simulations/iraq/PILPGIraq 
FedCouncilGuide.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING GUIDE] (explaining the 
various functions that the High Commission could possibly fulfill). 
 270. See, e.g., National Commission for Minorities Website, http://ncm.nic.in/ 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (identifying the need for a commission in a country with 
a similarly diverse ethnic composition). 
 271. See generally The Secretary-General, Preparatory Comm., Preparatory 
Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.189/PC.1/8 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/ 
WCAR/1.8e.pdf (describing an organization that provided remedies for human 
rights and minority rights violations). The actions taken by the South African 
Human Rights Commission included a counseling hotline, a racism audit by an 
independent evaluator required by all public and private institutions, increased 
public awareness about rights, a media fairness inquiry, and efforts to provide a 
judicial forum for redress. See id. ¶¶ 62-64. The report also stated that exemplary 
countries were taking actions to provide remedies through “recourse to national 
institutions, reporting of violations to law enforcement officials, prompt and 
effective action by bodies responsible for the administration of justice, educational 
activities that focused on curbing and eliminating racial discrimination, and the 
activities of the media, which should promote understanding and tolerance.” See 
id. ¶ 16. 
 272. See TAL art. 50 (establishing the Office of the Ombudsman, which inquires 
into complaints lodged by citizens against governmental authorities). 
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under which there is an Office of the Ombudsman to receive, initiate, 
and investigate complaints of government actions that are “arbitrary 
or contrary to law.”273 The purpose of the Ombudsman is to guard 
protection of minority rights through investigation of abuse and 
initiation of legal methods of redress for rights violations.274
CONCLUSION 
Despite the concerns of the ethno-sectarian divisionists, the way 
forward for Iraq is not one of entrenched ethno-sectarian divide and 
mistrust, but rather the creation of a modern federal state that builds 
upon Iraq’s existing political and legal structures in a manner 
consistent with Iraq’s complex historical identity. 
A stable political future for Iraq begins with the fundamental 
position that Iraq requires a federal structure based upon an eighteen 
governorate model as set forth in the Constitution. With the sub-
federal boundaries already drawn, Iraqi political leaders are in a 
position to devolve appropriate power to these entities in an 
asymmetric and gradual manner. With this power devolution, Iraq 
would benefit from the development of systems of resource and 
revenue distribution to promote fair and equitable economic growth 
across the federation. Coordination mechanisms such as framework 
 273. Id.; see also IRAQ CONSTITUTION art. 138 (annulling the TAL and its 
Annex, except for Articles 53(A) and 58). The TAL remains relevant in this 
instance, however, because the National Commission for Human Rights was 
formed under the TAL. 
 274. See Zsuzsanna Antal, Introduction to Hungarian Law Research, 
GLOBALEX (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Hungary.htm (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2008) (describing the role of the Hungarian Ombudsman for the 
Protection of National and Minority Rights elected by a two-thirds parliamentary 
vote); see also Maxine Sleeper, Note, Anti-Discrimination Laws in Eastern 
Europe: Towards Effective Implementation 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 196, 
198 (2001) (explaining that the Hungarian Ombudsman has been especially active 
in ensuring educational opportunities for minorities); Istvan Riba, Minority Self-
Governments in Hungary, HUNGARIAN Q., Vol. XL, No. 155, Aug. 1999, at 80, 
available at http://www.hungarianquarterly.com/no155/080.html (stating the 
effectiveness of the Hungarian Ombudsman in providing assistance to minorities 
whose self-governance in regions was challenged by the majority population). 
Other countries with Ombudsman offices include Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. See 
Ombudsman Worldwide Offices, http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/Links 
/Worldwide-Offices.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). 
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legislation and dispute resolution committees are also necessary to 
ensure that the transition to viable federalism occurs with minimal 
encumbrance. To respect the complex and diverse identities of Iraqis, 
safeguards need to be established to protect the rights of sub-federal 
entities and Iraq’s many minorities. 
Thus, the political future of Iraq is not a return to failed 
approaches of division, but rather the construction of a viable 
modern federal state that promotes unity, political compromise, and 
consensus building. 
 
